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Dedication
On July 31, 2002, a terrorist attack at the University of Jerusalem
took the life of my best and dearest friend, David Gritz. He had arrived at the
university just the week before, to begin studies in Hebraic scholarship
through a grant from the Hartzmann Institute. David was a true scholar, the
finest I have ever known. He left for Jerusalem against the repeated
protestations of his parents and his friends, including my own. But for
David, intellectual curiosity triumphed over all. I once told him that he
would quite willingly hang upside-down on Mt. Fuji if he felt he could learn
something from it, and he playfully reminded me of that comment when we
last spoke on the phone, just hours before his plane left Paris. David's death
robbed the world of one who might, through his intelligence, compassion
and perseverance, have transformed it.
I dedicate this article as I have dedicated my life, to the memory of
my friend David Gritz, and the promise that his will be among the last
sacrifices to the barbaric maw of terrorism.
Introduction
This article will examine the existing state of international law
regarding terrorists and terrorism. The article's purpose is to recommend a
* B.A., McGill University, 1999; J.D., Cornell University, 2002; L.L.M., University
of British Columbia, 2003; M.A., Brown University, 2004. Currently completing a
Ph.D., Brown University. His first book, "Seize the Trident," is available from
McGraw-Hill; also recently featured in The New York Times, Legal Affairs
Magazine, The Guardian, and the American Bar Association National Security Law
Report. He can be reached at douglas-burgess@brown.edu.
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new stratagem for recognizing organized terrorism, placing it within the
context of international criminal law, and establishing parameters for a
state's ability to respond to it. I will argue that the existing international
common law regarding piracy, particularly as a crime of universal
jurisdiction, is the most useful framework for defining terrorism and
determining a legitimate state response.
International law is largely predicated on the assumption that all
parties to a given conflict are states.' Furthermore, statehood is understood
as a distinct and recognizable category, determined principally by established
territorial boundaries, an acting government, and international recognition.
2
Many centuries of history have reinforced the view that only states may
make war upon each other, form treaties, or act in general as principals on
the international stage. Consequently, the current body of international law
remains rooted in traditional concepts of statehood and aggression. These
concepts have existed, virtually unchanged, since the very genesis of
diplomacy.4
Yet recent events have demonstrated how perilously arcane these
concepts have become. The presumption of state versus state conflict fails to
consider the threat of non-state actors that possess enormous financial and
human resources and thus pose a comparable threat to established states.
These include multinational terrorist organizations. While international law
does not ignore their existence, declarations, conventions and covenants
reflect a conception of terrorism as either an isolated act perpetrated by
individuals, or as a state-sponsored activity sharing many similarities with
1 While it is impossible to demonstrate this statement with a single reference, a brief
perusal of U.N. Conventions, available online at www.un.org/events/conferences.
htm, evidences its validity.
2 See 1 OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW 120-123, 330-331 (9th ed. 1992)
(hereinafter OPPENHEIM).3 See Jacob W.F. Sundberg, Piracy: Air and Sea, 20 DEPAULL. REv. 337, 362-363
(1971).
4 See generally Michael Rosetti, Note, Terrorism as a Violation of the Law of
Nations After Kadic v. Karadzic, 12 ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 565 (1997)
(discussing how federal courts lacked jurisdiction over claims against private
individuals accused of violating international law until the Second Circuit Court of
Appeals' 1996 decision in Kadic v. Karadzik; and, how the lack of an international




genocide or other proscribed state conduct.5 Neither definition confronts the
reality of international terrorism: highly organized, well-funded and potent
organizations whose strength is derived from the very properties that
distinguish them from states. Such properties include the lack of territorial
boundaries, lack of recognized government, and lack of international
recognition.6 A single perpetrator of a terrorist act may be brought to justice,
but the organization itself remains beyond the law. There is currently no
recognition in international law of the crime of terrorism per se: that is, the
crime of belonging to a terrorist organization without necessarily committing
acts of violence.7 The crucial problem facing international jurists is to
formulate a working definition of terrorist and terrorism that recognizes the
uniqueness of the threat they pose, while placing them within the parameters
of established international law.8
Events have conspired to make this an even more daunting task.
The world after September 11, 2001, is in a state of profound flux, as the
United States pursues its "war on terrorism." President George W. Bush has
pithily summed up its policy with the phrase, "You are either with us or with
the terrorists." 9 Yet, the lines of demarcation are often difficult to place. In
the aftermath of the second Iraqi war, the President himself often conflates
the "war on terror" with American involvement in Iraq, despite the
tenuous-perhaps even nonexistent-linkage between the two conflicts.'0
On June 2, 2004, President Bush declared that "like the Second World War,
5 See, e.g., the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, Dec.
16, 1970, 860 U.N.T.S. 105; Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts
against the Safety of Civil Aviation, Sept. 23, 1971,974 U.N.T.S. 177; International
Convention against the Taking of Hostages, Dec. 17, 1979, 1316 U.N.T.S. 205;
International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings, Dec. 15, 1997,
37 I.L.M. 249 (1998); International Convention for the Suppression of the
Financing of Terrorism, Dec. 9, 1999, 39 I.L.M. 270 (2000).
6 Brian Jenkins, International Terrorism: A New Mode of Conflict, in
INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM AND WORLD SECURITY 21 (David Carlton & Carlo
Schaerf eds., 1975).
7 See Yonah Alexander, Terrorism: A Definitional Focus, in TERRORISM AND THE
LAW 3 (Yonah Alexander & Edgar H. Brenner eds., 2001).
8 See generally Alfred Rubin, Legal Response to Terror. An International Criminal
Court?, 43 HARV. INT'L L.J. 65 (Winter 2002) (critiquing the International Criminal
Court as an arena to try terrorists).
9 D.T. Max, The Making of the Speech, N.Y. TIMES, October 7, 2001, § 6, at 32.
1o Douglas Jehl, Pentagon Reportedly Skewed C.I.A. 's View of Qaeda Tie, N.Y.
TIMES, October 22, 2004, at A10.
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our present conflict began with a ruthless surprise attack on the United
States," which evinces a desire to equate the present "war on terror" with
traditional pre-existing concepts of state versus state conflict.1 He followed
this statement with another, even more entrenched in archaic conceptions of
warfare: "We will not forget that treachery and we will accept nothing less
than victory over the enemy."' 12 It is not always clear which enemy the
President has in mind, or to which conflict he refers. What, for example,
constitutes ultimate "victory" against an enemy which lacks territorial
boundaries and governmental structures?
International law, as articulated by the United Nations, is also
struggling-and failing-to keep pace with this new form of conflict.
Despite recent efforts, there remains no formal definition of the crime of
organized terrorism, but rather a hodgepodge of covenants addressing such
individual elements as aerial hijacking and hostage taking.' 3 The necessity
for an international law on terrorism is doubly immediate, for at this
moment, both the United States and its terrorist nemeses pursue each other
across a vast chessboard of states with no international covenants governing
their actions. The United States has held several hundred persons captive
without charge at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, and has engaged the full weight
of its secret services in a covert and silent manhunt.' 4 The terrorists,
meanwhile, continue to plan and execute their crimes beyond the jurisdiction
of the International Criminal Court (ICC) or like international judicial
bodies.' 5 The current state of international law falls well behind in
1 Bush compares Iraq, terror wars to World War II, CNN.com, June 3, 2004 at
http://cnnstudentnews.cnn.com/2004/ALLPOLITICS/06/02/bush.speech/ (last
accessed February 19, 2005).
12 Id. These comments are also available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/
releases/2004/06/print/20040602.html.
13 See generally EDWARD MCWHINNEY, AERIAL PIRACY AND INTERNATIONAL LAW
(1971); JAMES A. AREY, THE SKY PIRATES (1972), (discussing the events of several
aerial hijackings and the international community's difficulties in addressing the
problem). An enumerated list of U.N. Conventions is available online at
http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/terrorismconventions.html.
"4 Paisley Dodds, Associated Press, 3 years in operation, Guantanamo remains,
BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 10, 2005, at http://www.boston.com/news/nation/articles/
2005/01 / 10/3_years in operationguantanamo remains?pg=full.
15 Todd M. Sailer, Comment, The International Criminal Court. An Argument to
Extend Its Jurisdiction to Terrorism and a Dismissal of U.S. Objections, 13 TEMP.
INT'L & COMP. L.J. 311, 321 (Fall 1999).
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addressing this new reality, written instead for a world where terrorism
existed only on the lunatic fringe of international society, and the greatest
enemy to the nation state came from another state. 16 Thus, the 21 t century
"war on terrorism" is being conducted-by both states and non-states-in a
relative vacuum of international law.
Recent efforts to formulate a comprehensive international law on
terrorism and place it within the jurisdiction of the newly-formed ICC are
noteworthy, but fruitless.'7 As with earlier attempts concerning the crime of
aggressive war, the debate has deadlocked over a workable definition for the
crime of "terrorism. '18 The hackneyed adage that "one man's terrorist is
another man's freedom fighter"'9 renders any attempt at definition virtually
impossible, dividing states on ideological lines and convoluting the situation
all the more. Yet it also presupposes a conception of terrorism starkly
different from the reality. Terrorists rarely fit the semi-romantic imagery of
ragtag revolutionaries; today they are organized, well-funded and
multinational bodies that have more in common with international
corporations than freedom fighters.20
Romantic imagery aside, there is an easily recognized legal entity
with which these new terrorists have remarkable similarities: pirates. This
article will demonstrate that piracy is, in fact, the legal genesis of modern
16 See generally id. (arguing that the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court
should be extended to include jurisdiction over transnational terrorists).
17 1 would draw the reader's attention to the efforts of the U.N. Working Group on
Terrorism, Harvard's Long-Term Legal Response to Terrorism, and the dedicated
scholarship of a small number of academics, including Samuel Menefee, Alfred
Rubin, Todd Sailer and James Fry. Mr. Fry has advanced a novel argument for the
inclusion of terrorist crimes in the ICC under the umbrella jurisdiction of either
Crimes Against Humanity or Genocide. See, e.g., James D. Fry, Comment,
Terrorism as a Crime Against Humanity and Genocide: The Backdoor to Universal
Jurisdiction, 7 UCLA J. INT'L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 169 (2002). While I applaud Mr.
Fry's efforts, I believe that the attempt to pack and stuff terrorism into an existing
crime is rather like fitting the Ugly Sister's foot into Cinderella's slipper. It needs its
own defmition and its own category, but, paradoxically, both must be grounded in
existing law or risk lacking legitimacy; hence, as I will argue, the solution ofpiracy.
8Alexander, supra note 7, at 7.
19 See, e.g., Stanley Fish, Don't Blame Relativism, 12 THE RESPONSIVE COMMUNITY
27, 30 (2002) (noting that Reuters News Service did not want to use the word
"terrorism" in a news story for that reason).
20 See Jennifer Trahan, Terrorism Conventions: Existing Gaps and Different
Approaches, 8 NEw ENG. INT'L & COMP. L. ANN, 215, 228 (2002).
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organized terrorism. The commonalities between the two are profound, from
their aims, methods, and motivations on the one hand, and the deleterious
effects on and legal responses of the victimized state on the other.2' I will
argue that the best and easiest course for formulating a new international law
on terrorism is to root it in the existing customary and statutory law of
piracy. This will serve two purposes: first, it will make terrorism a crime of
international universal jurisdiction, proscribing offences and determining
punishment; second, conversely, it will check the impunity of the state's
actions in pursuing, capturing and prosecuting terrorists, placing these
actions within the regulatory matrix of international law.
To equate pirates with terrorists is a radical departure from existing
legal theory and requires some explication at the outset. Though organized
international terrorism may be a creature of the late twentieth century,22 it
has one significant precedent: the concept of state versus non-state conflict,
otherwise unique, has a long and colorful history in the law of piracy.23 The
legal recognition of piracy as a crime against all humanity, and of the pirate
himself as an enemy of the human race, emerges from centuries of
intermittent conflict and cooperation between states and pirates. 24 The idea
of pirates as hostis humani generi (enemies of the human race) may be two
thousand years old,25 but it has taken almost all of that time for that
conception to gain ultimate acceptance in international law. Until the
Declaration of Paris in 1856, the legal geopolitical conception fluctuated
between criminality and barbarity on the one hand, to an essential adjunct of
the state's armed services (and useful tool of political coercion) on the
other.26 The idea of piracy as a universal crime was the ultimate result of
21 See Samuel Menefee, The Achille Lauro and Similar Acts as Piracy: Two
Arguments, in PIRACY AT SEA 179-180 (Eric Ellen ed., 1989).
22 See J. Henk Leurdijk, Summary of Proceedings: Our Violent Future, in
INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM AND WORLD SECURITY, supra note 6, at 3.
23 See ALFRED P. RUBIN, THE LAW OF PIRACY 1 (2nd ed. 1998) (one historical
meaning of "piracy" involves action by "unrecognized states or recognized states
whose governments are not considered to be empowered at international law to
authorize the sorts of public activity that is questioned, like the Barbary States of
about 1600-1830").24 Philip Buhler, New Struggle with an Old Menace: Towards a Revised Definition
of Maritime Piracy, 8 CURRENTS: INT'L TRADE L.J. 61, 63 (1999).25 RUBIN, supra note 23, at 17.
26 See generally M.J. Peterson, An Historical Perspective on the Incidence of




this conflict, as states determined that piracy was too heinous to be a
legitimate tool of political persuasion.27 Hence, piracy gained its current
status as an international crime: a crime not against one state, nor even all
states, but against humanity itself. By the same logic, pirates could no
longer take refuge behind the protection of sponsor states; their status as
international criminals subjected them to universal jurisdiction. In effect, the
categorization of pirates as hostis humani generi created a third legal
category in international law halfway between states and individuals; pirates
were deemed at 'war' with civilization itself, and thus granted neither the
protections of citizenship nor the sovereignty of states.28 Pirates were akin to
a virus in the international body politic, sharing some of the qualities of a
living organism, but limited in function to the destruction of the body and
thus not meriting the dignity granted to a living being.
In the ultimate legal definition of pirates as hostis humani generi,
the battle for defining terrorism has already been waged and concluded.
Terrorism may adopt piracy's legal history if it can be shown that the
proposed "crime" of terrorism, as defined by its acts, motivations,
perpetrators and effects, is tantamount in all respects to the crime of piracy.
In other words, the crime of piracy will serve as a valid legal precedent for
terrorism, as well as a basis for its law. First, as indicated above, it will
provide a working definition for organized terrorism as an international
crime outside of and in addition to individual terrorist acts which already
have recognition in international or domestic law, and will likewise offer a
definition of 'terrorist' that meshes neatly within existing international
customary and statutory law. Second, it will delineate the legitimate actions
states may take in the pursuit, capture and trial of terrorists. The United
States' "war on terror" need not be legal terra nova: history is replete with
examples of states employing their armed forces to root out piracy.29
Equating terrorists with pirates has the efficacious affect of recognizing their
level of organization and potential threat, without granting them the
27 See RUBIN, supra note 23, at 203 n.255 (signatories of the Paris Declaration
agreed that "[p]rivateering is, and remains, abolished").
28 For examples of this definition in contemporary common law, see In re Piracy
Jure Gentium, 1934 A.C. 586, 589 (PC); H.M. Advocate v. Cameron, 1971 S.L.T
202, 206 (H.C.J.). See also BARRY DUBNER, THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL SEA
PIRACY (1980) (an excellent overview of the history and evolution of piracy law).
29 Including, perhaps most notably, President Jefferson's use of the fledgling
American Navy to rout the Barbary corsairs in 1804.
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legitimacy reserved for states. 30 Furthermore, the crime of piracy is far from
arcane in contemporary international law: it remains, alongside genocide and
a select few others, a crime of universal jurisdiction. Thus, by equating
terrorists with pirates, the problem of capture in a recalcitrant or openly
hostile state is neatly avoided. A pirate may be captured wherever he is
found, provided that capture is undertaken within the boundaries of
international law. If the same rule were extended to terrorists, states might
enter and retrieve them within the borders of other states without risking
impingement on that state's sovereignty. By the same logic, states would
have no legal standing to offer protection to terrorists within their borders.
Tracing the history of piracy and government response throughout
the ages reveals the birth and evolution of modem terrorism. Granted, this is
terrorism in its earliest larval form; nevertheless, it shares many of the
political and methodological components of its twenty-first century
descendant. This train of logic leads inexorably to an even more momentous
concept: that terrorism, in its current form, is a form of piracy. It may seem
that terrorism is solely a by-product of twentieth century wars and empires,
de-colonization and the Cold War.3' While these may explain the existence
of certain terrorist groups, they do not in themselves account for the greater
question of how terror became a political tool in the first place. The
criminality of the act itself, not the circumstances motivating a particular act,
is the central consideration for any code of law. Thus, we do not inquire
why a despot commits genocide,32 but rather whether genocide itself is a
crime that must be punished, and how to manufacture a law to do so. The
questions of "what is terrorism?" and "how can we approach it in the legal
context?" can only be answered in one way: by understanding its historical
foundation in the law of piracy.
This article is divided into three sections. Part I examines the
cultural parallels between terrorism and piracy in world history, arguing that
they are in fact two species of the same overall political genus. Part II
considers the developing legal history of piracy as a possible precedent for
30 Terrorists, like pirates, will be termed "enemies of the human race." This
terminology effectively removes terrorists from the protections of citizenship
through the commission of international criminal acts and membership in a terrorist
organization which has committed or plans to commit such acts.31 See Brian M. Jenkins, Future Trends in International Terrorism, in VIOLENCE AT
SEA: A REVIEW OF TERRORISM, ACTS OF WAR AND PIRACY, AND
COUNTERMEASURES TO PREVENT TERRORISM 41-42 (Brian A.H. Parritt ed., 1986).
32 If we do, it is confined to the evidentiary phase in determining the breadth of the
crime and the despot's individual culpability.
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contemporary terrorist legislation. Part III draws these arguments together,
proposing a model international law on organized terrorism culled from the
existing law of piracy, including legal definitions and suggested jurisdiction.
I. The Historical Linkages Between Piracy and Terrorism
Piracy has flourished on the high seas for as long as maritime
commerce has existed between states. 33 While incidents and methods vary
from one region to another, both the practice and its practitioners bear
universal similarities. Piracy is an act of depredation on the high seas:
including torture, homicide, seizure of goods, and destruction of property.
Any of these acts, committed independently, is still regarded as piracy.
34
Pirates, likewise, may be shortly defined as persons existing beyond the
natural scope of society-both its actual and juridical borders-whose
activities are directed against the persons or commerce of that society.35
It was the Roman Republic that first gave definition to piracy, 36 and
much of its law still holds true today. First and foremost is Cicero's famous
definition of pirates as hostis humani generi,37; but, of nearly equal
importance were the attendant laws furnished by Cicero and the Roman
Senate which first construed piracy not as a mere action against individuals
33 See HENRY A. ORMEROD, PIRACY IN THE ANCIENT WORLD: AN ESSAY IN
MEDITERRANEAN HISTORY 13 (1997).
34 The idea that piracy is merely an act of theft at sea has been outdated for several
centuries, despite common belief to the contrary. This point will be raised in some
detail later, but it is worth mentioning here. Professor Brierly, in his famous treatise
published in 1928, does not even mention the pecuniary aspect of piracy, writing
instead:
Any state may bring in pirates for trial by its own courts, or on the ground
that they are hostis humani generi ... There is no authoritative definition of
international piracy, but it is of the essence of a pirate act to be an act of
violence, committed at sea or at any rate closely connected with the sea, by
persons not acting under proper authority.
J. L. BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE INTERNATIONAL
LAW OF PEACE 240-41 (5th ed. 1955)(1928). The sixth edition of this work has the
language rewritten to reflect the definition of piracy in the 1958 Convention, which
I discuss in this article.
35 This principle is articulated concisely in the famous piracy case of United States
v. Smith, 18 U.S. 153, 161 (1820), finding that a pirate, under the law of nations, is
an enemy of the human race; being an enemy of all, he is liable to be punished by
all.36 RUBIN, supra note 23, at 2.
371Id. at 17 n.61.
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but against the nation as a whole.38 The Romans, already mindful of the
efficacy of piracy as a tool of hostile governments, gave the offence a
common jurisdiction exceeding traditional legal boundaries, thus, in effect
creating a very early example of international law.39 The claim that pirata
est hostis generis humani is in fact drawn from a larger argument by Cicero
that pirata non est ex perdullium numero definitus, sed communis hostis
omnium. 40 The twin concepts of hostis humani generis and the law of
nations led to the following conclusions in Roman law: "(a) all.., crimes
which constitute 'piracy' [must] occur in areas outside the municipal
jurisdictional competence of any nation; (b) "the 'pirate' is... [,
consequently,] an enemy of [no individual state but] the [entire] human race;
(c) the pirate [must and] should be prosecuted under municipal law... after
capture," but the right to prosecute is common to all nations and singular to
none.4 1 These early precepts form the basis of all international thought
42
regarding piracy up to and including the present. Most particularly, the
Romans must be credited with introducing the central element of
international criminal law: universal jurisdiction.43 It is interesting to note
that piracy is not merely one of the crimes for which such jurisdiction is
applied (the others being slavery, genocide and crimes of aggression) but the
first such crime. 4 The idea that pirates may be seized anywhere they are
found and prosecuted by any country that captures them, is of critical
importance when considering the possibility of a linkage between piracy law
and organized terrorism.
Jumping ahead some years to the late sixteenth century, one finds
quite a different definition at work. Queen Elizabeth viewed pirates as an
essential adjunct to the Royal Navy, and was lavish in granting them letters
of mark against Spanish trade.45 In the last uneasy years of peace between
the two nations, piracy was regarded by the Crown in much the same way as
state-sponsored terrorism is viewed today: an ideal way to strike one's
3 ld. at 18.
39 id..
40 Sundberg, supra note 3, at 338 (the quote translates as "piracy is not a crime
directed against a definite number of persons, but rather aggression against the
community as a whole").
41 DUBNER, supra note 28, at 42.
42 See RUBIN, supra note 23, at 2.
43 See id. at 117-118.
44See Fry, supra note 17, at 175.
45 Peterson, supra note 26, at 52.
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enemy and hide the blade.46 State-sponsored piracy aided this aim in
numerous ways: (1) it trained future captains by testing their skills against
the Spanish before the navies could meet in force; (2) it bled Spanish
resources and frustrated their governance of empire, most particularly in the
New World; (3) it vastly enriched the English government, providing for the
construction of the new fleet; (4) it provided a huge resource of trained and
experienced seamen to man the fleet once it was ready; (5) most importantly,
it provoked the Spanish into waging war before they were fully prepared, on
the necessity of countering the pirate menace.47 It is interesting to note that
only one of these motivations was entirely monetary. The case for correlating
English privateering and contemporary government-sponsored terrorism
relies on an understanding of piracy as more than theft for private gain. In
its Elizabethan form, piracy-like modern terrorism-was a means of
employing force and terror to achieve political ends.48
With the accession of James I to the throne in the first years of the
seventeenth century came the end of the Spanish wars (by the Treaty of
Londonin 1604) and, for a brief period, the return of law against the pirates. 49
The first years of James' reign were punctuated by yearly anti-piracy
proclamations. ° Ironically, his efforts achieved precisely what he most
wished to avoid. The sudden illegality of privateering deprived scores of
men of their professions, while the decommissioning of much of the Royal
Navy left hundreds of seamen abandoned on the wharvesi' In 1604, in an
act of good faith towards the Spanish, James I formally revoked all letters of
mark. Though he would later offer clemency to those pirates who sought it,
most of the Crown's privateers simply shifted bases and professions and
became pirates in earnest.52 The sorry situation was best expressed by
Captain John Smith:
King James, who from his infancie had reigned in peace with
all Nations, had no [e]mployment for those men of warre so
that those that were rich rested with what they had; those that
46 See RUBIN, supra note 23, at 31.
4 7 HUGH F. RANKIN, THE GOLDEN AGE OF PIRACY 3-5 (1969).
48See RUBIN, supra note 23, at 59.
49 See David J. Starkey, Pirates and Markets, in BANDITS AT SEA: A PIRATES
READER 111 (C.R. Pennell ed., 2001)
5oSee id.
51See id.52 RANKIN, supra note 47, at 5.
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were poore and had nothing but from hand to mouth, turned
Pirats; some, because they became sleighted of those for
whom they had got much wealth; some, for that they could not
get their due; some, that had lived bravely, would not abase
themselves to poverty; some vainly, only to get a name; others
for revenge, covetousnesse, or as ill.53
As Smith alludes, the reasons for turning pirate were not always monetary.
Though many pirates were little more than "sea-robbers," 54 almost as many
went to sea to work out demons within themselves: feelings of inferiority,
rebelliousness against their low station in life, anarchical hatred, jealousy,
revenge.5 The pirates of this Golden Age (1688-1725) were, in the words
of one historian, "a sorry lot of human trash. 56 Though often courageous,
sometimes merciful, and occasionally even pious, they were on the whole the
dregs of England's merchant marine. 7 Cast out from the fold, these men
regarded piracy as a means of exacting personal vengeance on civilization
itself 8 A pirate ship was a kingdom unto itself, and a "pirate captain" its
king. Some captains, like Edward Teach, amassed this power totally unto
themselves and ruled as despots through a combination of terror, senseless
barbarism, and good seamanship. 59 Teach, also known as Blackbeard,
refined psychological terrorism to an art.6 ° More than any other pirate before
or since, Teach understood the symbiotic relationship of terrorism and
61piracy. While some pirate captains gave quarter to their captured prizes
and were often deposed as weaklings by their own crews in response,62
Blackbeard was a terrorist par excellence. When boarding a prize in battle,
he wove long-burning fuses into his enormous beard, wreathing his face in
53 Id.
54 See Marcus Rediker, The Seaman as Pirate.- Plunder and Social Banditry at Sea,
in BANDITS AT SEA: A PIRATE READER, supra note 49, at 142.
51 See id.
56 RANKIN, supra note 47, at 22.
57See Rediker, supra note 55, at 140-4 1.
58Id. at 139-40.
59 See id. at 150.
60 See id.
61 SHIRLEY CARTER HUGHSON, THE CAROLINA PIRATES AND COLONIAL COMMERCE,
1670-1740 69-83 (Spartanburg: Reprint Company, 1992) (1894).
62 One such pirate, Edward England, earned such a reputation for leniency that his




green sulphuric smoke and giving himself a truly satanic appearance.63 Like
the Vikings before him, and al-Qaeda long afterwards, Blackbeard
recognized the value inherent in a reputation for unparalleled barbarism and
ferocity.
64
Yet while some pirate vessels resembled dictatorships, others had
the markings of a crude democracy. Pirate captains were often elected and
interchangeable. 65 The level of organization on a pirate vessel could be
startling. Totally removed from the laws of society, they made their own,
and lived by them scrupulously. These so-called "pirate articles" were often
as specific and meticulous as acts of Parliament. An excerpt from those of
Captain John Phillips in 1723 provides an example of the articles' scope and
breadth:
1. Every man shall obey civil Command; the Captain shall have
one full Share and a half in all prizes; the Master, Carpenter,
Boatswain, and Gunner shall have one Share and a quarter.
2. If any Man shall offer to run away, or keep any Secret from
the Company, he shall be maroon[e]d with one Bottle of
Powder, one Bottle of Water, one small Arm, and Shot.
4. If at any Time we shall meet another Marrooner (that is
Pyrate) that Man shall sign his Articles without the Consent of
our Company, shall suffer such Punishment as the Captain and
Company shall think fit.
8. If any man shall lose a Joint in time of an Engagement, shall
have 400 Pieces of Eight; if a limb 800.
9. If at any time you meet with a prudent Woman, that Man that
offers to meddle with her, without her Consent, shall suffer
present Death.66
These articles suggest that the pirates did not exist in the state of Hobbesian
anarchy so often attributed to them, but were instead often as organized and
63 C. R. Pennell, Brought to Book: Reading about Pirates, in BANDITS AT SEA: A
PIRATE READER, supra note 49, at 10.
64 Pennell points out that "a victim might pause for thought before resisting a man
with Teach's reputation," id.65Rediker, supra note 55, at 142-143.
66 RANKIN, supra note 47, at 31.
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disciplined a crew as any in the Royal Navy. Pirate captains sometimes
furthered this image by mimicking the navy's practice of reading the Articles
of War aloud each Sunday after prayers. While the crew stood at attention,
the pirate captain recited each article and punishment with due solemnity.
67
The "pirate articles" are of particular relevance when considering the
nature of piracy and its relation to organized terrorism, for they provide an
early example of an organization with its own directors, codes of conduct
and punishments, functioning for the sole purpose of disrupting trade and
wreaking havoc. This further moves the pirate from legal definition as "sea
robber" and closer to hostis humani generis. While some might argue that
pirate acts are synonymous with, for example, rules of membership in an
inner-city gang, it can be counter-argued that they indicate the legal
separation and distinctiveness of a pirate crew, fostered by actual separation
from any nation or rule of law.68 Thus the pirate ship becomes a quasi-state
unto itself, a legal anomaly which customary international law recognized by
granting universal jurisdiction on its capture.
The most interesting element of piracy in the Golden Age, and the
most crucial in establishing a nexus between piracy and terrorism, is the
motivation of the pirate himself. As suggested earlier, it was frequently as
much political as pecuniary. Pirates often saw themselves as rebels against
the established order, meting out ferocious revenge on a society that had
wronged them from birth. Much of their rage was justified.69 The pirate
captains of the late seventeenth century, unlike their gentlemanly forbears,
came almost exclusively from the lowest castes of society. 70 They had been
pressed into naval service at a young age, spending most of their lives as
ordinary seamen. 7' The rank of officer was purchased rather than earned or
inherited by virtue of aristocratic title. 72 Thus, the ordinary seaman with
twenty years' experience often felt, quite rightly, that he knew more about
67 For more examples of pirate 'democracy,' see MARCUS REDIKER, BETWEEN THE
DEVIL AND THE DEEP BLUE SEA: MERCHANT SEAMEN, PIRATES, AND THE ANGLO-
AMERICAN MARITIME WORLD, 1700-1750 (1987). Professor Rediker, in his superb
study, argues that the pirates saw themselves as revolutionaries against the
hierarchical class system of England, a thesis which draws heavily from the "war
against all the world" theme discussed infra.6 8 Rediker, supra note 55, at 142.691d. at 141.
70Id. at 142-43.
7 Id. at 140-141.72 See id. at 143.
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seamanship than his captain." When abruptly released from service and left
destitute ashore, it was hardly surprising that many such men found piracy a
means not only of gaining personal wealth, but taking it as their "pound of
flesh" from aristocratic society.
74
The idea of piracy as personal war against civilization is recurrent
throughout the literature of the time. 75 Daniel Defoe tells of one pirate who
"reduced himself afresh to the savage state of nature by declaring war
against all mankind."76 Another contemporary account describes the pirate
career of Edward Low, who after assailing his captain, fled with a small
party of confreres and "took a small Vessel ... [,hoisted] a Black Flag, and
declare[d] War against all the World., 77 Captain Charles Bellamy employed
almost exactly the same language as he lambasted a recalcitrant merchant
captain:
Damn ye, you are a sneaking puppy, and so are all those who
submit to be governed by laws which rich men have made for
their own security, for the cowardly whelps have not the
courage otherwise to defend what they get by their own knavery
...You are a devilish conscious rascal, damn ye! I am a free
prince and have as much authority to make war on the whole
world as he who has a hundred sail of ships and an army of a
hundred thousand men in the field.78
The concept of piracy as a war against the world reflected a profound shift in
governmental attitudes towards the practice. The golden age of piracy began
in earnest just as two wars ended: the conflict between England and France
known as King William's War, concluded in 1697 by the Treaty of Ryswick,
and yet another war between England and Spain ending with English victory
in 1692. 79 With the empire in a state of uneasy peace, England, as before,
abruptly revoked the licenses of its privateers. 80 Frustrated and cheated, the
privateers turned on their erstwhile government sponsors and directed their
activities against all trade, English or otherwise, between Europe and her
71 See id.
74 See generally REDIKER, supra note 68.
75 See Pennell, supra note 64, at 4-5.
76 RANKIN, supra note 47, at 22.77 Id. at 147.
78 Id. at 25 (emphasis added).
79 See Starkey, supra note 49, at 118.8 0 Id
.
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dominions.8" Thus, there came a remarkable inverse: piracy, which had for
centuries been a weapon used by governments against each other, suddenly
became a weapon used against them.
82
Corollaries between the Golden Age pirates' "war against the
world" and modem terrorism are irresistible and profound. Perhaps for the
first time in history we find a group of men who banded together in extra-
territorial conclaves, remove themselves from the protection and jurisdiction
of the nation-state, and declare a personal war against civilization itself.83 As
Elizabethan piracy bears many similarities to state-sponsored terrorism, so
too may this later form of rebellion be seen as a precursor to modem
multinational terrorist organizations. One might argue that the comparison
fails on the grounds of motivation. While the pirates sought nothing more
politically than to strike back at their states, most international terrorists seek
by their acts to effect a political transformation.84 Yet once again, the means
outweigh the motivations. Both parties have effectively declared war against
the state, a form of state versus non-state conflict that is otherwise unique.
Moreover, both use the same tools-homicide, terror, wanton destruction,
and disruption of trade-to achieve a common aim: gaining notice to
themselves. This parallel cannot be stressed enough, for it represents the
most significant nexus between terrorism and piracy yet mentioned, and in
itself forms the basis for a new understanding of terrorism based on piratical
antecedents. The idea of attracting attention to one's self and one's cause is
the modus vivendi of all terrorism, whether government-sponsored,
organized, or anarchical. It underlies every terrorist act, from the
assassinations of key political figures in the nineteenth and twentieth
centuries to the hideous atrocity of the World Trade Center in the year
2001 .86 Terrorism is a means of projecting individual, extra-governmental
aims onto the world's consciousness through the commission of acts so
horrific as to captivate the world's attention.87 Thus, the pivotal issue is not
8 Id. at 119.
82 See generally BANDITS AT SEA: A PIRATE READER, supra note 49; PIRATES AND
PRIVATEERS: NEW PERSPECTIVES ON THE WAR ON TRADE IN THE EIGHTEENTH AND
NINETEENTH CENTURIES (David J. Starkey et al. eds., 1997).83 SeeRediker, supra note 55, at 139.84 See Leurdijk, supra note 22, at 3 (acts of terrorism are traditionally politically
motivated).
85 Jenkins, supra note 6, at 16-17.86 See id. Publicity is an important component. Jenkins notes that "[p]ublicity may
sometimes exceed fear as the leading effect of a terrorist incident," id. at 17.871d. ("[t]errorism is theatre").
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whether the terrorists seek by their acts to achieve a change of governmental
policy, a revolution, or even (as with the nineteenth century anarchists) a
collapse of all governments-it is only whether they employ terror to achieve
this notice. 8
This understanding of terrorism and its relation to piracy has two
prerequisites. First, the terrorists' activities must be in some way politically
motivated; it is not enough merely to commit terrorism to bring notice to
one's self.89 Were that the case, there could be no distinction between
ordinary homicide committed for personal fame (as in the case of John
Hinckley's attempted assassination of President Reagan) and acts of terror.
While this political element is essential, it may also be broadly defined. It is
not necessary, for example, that the terrorist seek some specific political
goal, such as the release of prisoners or the creation or the removal of
American forces from the Middle East; rather, it need only be an act
committed with the intention of gaining the notice of the world governments,
even if it is only to arouse their ire.90 Second, this idea of terrorism
presupposes an organization of some sort, not merely an individual.91 While
assassination as an act of terrorism has been mentioned, the current
understanding of "organized" terrorism is distinct from the actions of
individual terrorists in that it has two components: the act itself, and the
88 Perhaps the clearest indication of the parallels between these two concepts, piracy
and terrorism, occurred in the hijacking of the Italian cruise ship Achille Lauro by
members of the Palestinian Liberation Organization, and subsequent murder of
Jewish American passenger Leon Klinghoffer, on October 17, 1985. President
Reagan branded the attack an act of piracy, and demanded immediate justice. See
JACK A. GOTTSCHALK AND BRIAN P. FLANAGAN, JOLLY ROGER WITH AN Uzi: THE
RISE AND THREAT OF MODERN PIRACY 37 (2000). For a full account of the
ramifications of the Achille Lauro incident for contemporary understandings of
piracy, terrorism and international law, see generally George R. Constantinople,
Note, Toward a New Definition of Piracy: The Achille Lauro Incident, 26 VA.
J.INT'L L. 723 (1986); Menefee, supra note 21; Gerald P. McGinley, The Achille
Lauro Affair-Implications for International Law, 52 TENN. L. REv. 691 (1985);
MARITIME TERRORISM AND INTERNATIONAL LAW (Natalino Ronzitti ed., 1990)
(discussing the many legal questions that arose from the Achille Lauro affair).
89Alexander, supra note 7, at 7.
90 See Jenkins, supra note 6, at 15.
91 See id. at 16-19 (the main purposes of terrorism tend to further collective rather
than individual goals).
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conspiracy to commit the act.9 2 As a conspiracy requires the collaboration of
more than one person, we must conclude that the crime of organized
terrorism requires some form of organization, whether it is a small band of
disgruntled misfits or, as is more often the case, a vast and intricate
multinational entity.
With these two caveats in mind, let us briefly recap the parallels
between seventeenth century piracy and modem organized terrorism. They
can briefly be listed as follows: Both are (1) organizations composed of
volunteers, which (2) have a common goal of gaining the notice of the nation
states by (3) committing acts of terror, which may include destruction and
seizure of state or private property, frustration of commerce, and homicide.
Both (4) exist outside the territorial and jurisdictional boundaries of any
state, and thus may not be properly said to be resident in any state; (5) use
this extra-nationality as a means of pursuing their activities against states
and, consequently; (6) may be considered not as the enemy of one particular
state (even if that is the only state directly affected) but of all states; and, (6)
are fully cognizant not only of existing outside jurisdiction, but outside of
society itself, and use this also as a weapon against the states.
II. The Legal History of Piracy and Its Relation
to Modern Terrorism
In his address to an Old Bailey jury in 1696, Justice Sir Charles
Hedges announced what would, ultimately, become a working legal
definition for all piracy trials:
Now piracy is only a term for sea-robbery, piracy being
committed within the jurisdiction of the Admiralty. If any man
shall be assaulted within that jurisdiction, and his ship or
goods violently taken away without legal authority, this is
robbery and piracy. If the mariners of any ship shall violently
dispossess the master, and afterwards carry away the ship itself
of any of the good, or tackle, apparel or furniture, in any place
where the Lord Admiral hath, or pretends to hath jurisdiction,
93this is also robbery and piracy.
92 See OPPENHEIM, supra note 2, at 401 ("although terrorist acts may be privately
undertaken and motivated, they are often undertaken by organized groups... acting
in pursuit of international political goals, such as the attainment of a territory's
independence or protest against a particular state's actions").93 C. M. SENIOR, A NATION OF PIRATES: ENGLISH PIRACY IN ITS HEYDAY 38 (1976).
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While commendable in its clarity, Hedges' definition of piracy as "sea
robbery" fails to address a host of problems, among them: the difference
between piracy and privateering, the extent of the Lord Admiral's
jurisdiction, and what exactly is meant by the "violent dispossession" of a
ship's master by its crew. For the answers to these questions, we must turn
to a later and more notorious trial, that of Captain William Kidd.
The problems raised in Captain Kidd's trial began in 1700 with the
passage of the Piracy Act, which replaced jury trials for high seas piracy
with Crown-appointed commissions applying the rules of admiralty and civil
law.94 The Act was remarkably similar to that promulgated by James I half a
century before, and Edward Il three hundred years before that.9 Why did
the latter succeed where the former had failed? The difference lay in the
popular perception of piracy in the English mind. Though sympathetic juries
might still be inclined to look the other way, the vastly-increased
bureaucracy resulting from the Restoration created a body of civil servants
who owed allegiance neither to local burghers nor to the King in persona,
but to government. 96 Under the aegis of the Admiralty, the Crown commis-
sioners prosecuted pirates with the same fervor that the Navy hunted them.97
The trial of William Kidd provided a bizarre example of both
aspects of this new policy. In a fantastic twist of irony, Kidd was among
those captains whom the Crown had recruited to chase down and capture the
pirates.98 The story of his transformation from pirate hunter to pirate is both
fascinating and contentious, but nevertheless irrelevant to our purposes. 99
Suffice it to say that when brought before the Old Bailey on May 8, 1701, he
94 P. Bradley Nutting, The Madagascar Connection: Parliament and Piracy, 1690-
1701, 22 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 202, 209 (1978).9 5 See id., RUBIN, supra note 23, at 113.
96 See Anne Pdrotin-Dumon, The Pirate and the Emperor. Power and the Law on
the Seas, 1450-1850, in BANDITS AT SEA: A PIRATE READER, supra note 49, at 41-
42.
97 For a record of this shift in Crown policy, see CALENDAR OF STATE PAPERS,
COLONIAL SERIES, AMERICA AND WEST INDIES 1574-1733 (London 1862-1939).
See also JOHN FRANKLIN JAMESON, PRIVATEERING AND PIRACY IN THE COLONIAL
PERIOD: ILLUSTRATIVE DOCUMENTS (1923).
9 8 RUBIN, supra note 23, at 106.
99 Interested scholars should consult ROBERT C. RITCHIE, CAPTAIN KIDD AND THE
WAR AGAINST THE PIRATES (1986). It is a splendid account of Kidd's piratical
career and trial. The John Carter Brown Library at Brown University also holds an
eyewitness account of the trial entitled A Full Account of the proceedings in
relation to Captain Kidd. In Two Letters. (London 1701).
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was charged with six separate offenses, including piracy against four
merchant ships of foreign nationality, piracy in regard to an Armenian vessel
sailing under British protection, the Quedagh Merchant, and the murder of
crewmate William Moore, a gunner. 00 In their charges to the jury, the
justices emphasized that piracy meant considerably more than "only a term
for sea-robbery":
I need not tell you the heinousness of this offence
wherewith they [Kidd and his confreres] are charged, and
of what ill consequence it is to all trading nations. Pirates
are called hostis humani generi, the enemies to all
mankind; but they are especially so to those that depend
upon trade. These things that the prisoners stand charged
with are the most mischievous and prejudicial to trade that
can happen.'0 '
A fundamental shift was occurring in the law, from the laissez-faire attitudes
of Elizabethan privateering to a renaissance of hostis human igeneri. It was
Kidd's misfortune to fall exactly at the moment when this shift was taking
place. 0 2 By 1718, a pirate could, by law, be captured and executed by "any
one that takes them," with the scant provision that the captors must first
attempt to bring them to "some government" to be tried. 103 As it had been in
the Roman Republic, piracy was once again a crime of universal jurisdiction.
The passage of an even more draconian Piracy Act in 1721, stating
that all persons who "trade[d] with any pirate, by truck, barter, or exchange,"
if found guilty, would be esteemed pirates, 104 spelled the end of the pirates'
Golden Age.'0 5 Within a few short years, the sea lanes were reopened for
unimpeded trade and the greatest pirates of the age were dead, hiding, or
100 See Nutting, supra note 96, at 213.
101 THE TRIAL OF CAPTAIN KIDD 154 (Graham Brooks ed. 1930).
102 See generally RITCHIE, supra note 101.
103 The Trial of Major Stede Bonnet and thirty three others at the Court of Vice
Admiralty, Charlestown, South Carolina, for Piracy, 5 George I. A.D. 1718, 15
Howell's St. Tr. 1231, 1235 (1816), quoted in Lee A. Casey, David B. Rivkin, Jr.
& Darin R. Bartram, An Assessment of the Recommendations of the American Bar
Association Regarding the Use of Military Commissions in the War on Terror, at
18, at
http://www.fed-soc.org/Publications/Terrorism/ABAResponse.PDF
104 Piracy Act, 1721, 8 Geo. 1, c. 24, § 1 (Eng.).
'
0 5 See Starkey, supra note 49, at 121.
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respectable. 106 Nevertheless, piracy did not disappear. Spanish privateers
continued to harass the Americas, while the Barbary corsairs profited from
the sudden lack of competition and entrenched themselves as a permanent
menace to Mediterranean trade. 10 7 In fact, the greatest consequence of
English law was to remove piracy's domain from the center of imperial
affairs to its periphery. The pirates of the eighteenth and nineteenth
centuries were no longer the flotsam of Europe's mercantile labor force, but
tightly-woven bands of Eastern corsairs, succeeding generations of piratical
clans sharing familial, tribal, ethnic, religious, or political identities.'0 8 Their
continued survival was assured by the Great Powers themselves, as Britain
and France actively encouraged the corsairs to disrupt the other's trade.'0 9
This sort of government sponsorship seems, at first glance, like the
old Elizabethan policy writ large, but there was a crucial difference. The
combined influences of English law, burgeoning empires, and the
Enlightenment affected a profound shift in the western conception of
piracy." ° It became, in effect, an act of savagery. When committed by an
Englishman, Frenchman, or anyone belonging to the fraternity of states
which comprised "civilization," piracy was treason, tantamount to declaring
one's self at war with the nation state.'11 But if committed by "savages" it
was not only permissible, but politically useful. In the same way as England
and France employed First Nation tribes as proxies in North America, so too
did each fund and outfit their "own" corsairs to bedevil each others' trade."
2
By terming piracy an act of barbarity, the law was thus able to meld the
competing doctrines of political utility and hostis humani generis. A pirate,
in this latest incarnation, was a ruthless savage whose existence was not only
in conflict with the nation's laws, but with civilization itself. "3 This led to a
paradoxical situation, for the more the imperial powers employed pirates
against each other, the more their laws responded by driving the definition of
piracy further toward hostis humani generis, until it finally achieved its
modem definition as a crime so heinous and barbaric that all who committed
it were not only criminals, but enemies of humanity. 1
4
10 6 See Rediker, supra note 55, at 154.
10 7 See PETER EARLE, CORSAIRS OF MALTA AND BARBARY 266 (1970).
'
0o Id. at 23, 42.
'
09 Id. at 265-66.
10 See RUBIN, supra note 23, at 93.
"'. See id. at 94.
112 EARLE, supra note 108, at 265-66.
13 See generally BANDITS AT SEA, supra note 49.
114 See EARLE, supra note 108, at 267.
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The eighteenth century's bizarre double standard for piracy came
back upon itself early in the nineteenth century, when the European
governments realized they had created a beast they could no longer control.
The corsairs continued their attacks on trade long after peace was concluded,
a source of prolonged embarrassment and a serious economic threat to the
Great Powers. It was a pattern repeated throughout the history of
government-sponsored piracy, from the Hanseatic League to the
Enlightenment. Now, however, the perceived "barbarity" of the pirates gave
western nations an added impetus for declaring it an act of hostis humani
generis once and for all. In the period of conflict between 1790 and 1820,
there were numerous treaties between states pledging not to employ or
encourage privateers unless actually at war.115 The fledgling United States
Navy scored its first major victory in an engagement against the Barbary
pirates in 1804, signaling a new perception of pirates as an international
menace and providing an early example of the United States as "world
policeman."" 16 But the most significant development did not occur until
1856, when the Declaration of Paris-signed by nearly all the imperial
powers-abolished all forms of piracy, privateering and government
sponsorship."7 Pirates would thenceforth be hostis humanigeneri, subject to
capture and trial wherever they were found." 8  This chain of events
leading to our modern understanding of piracy bears chilling similarity to the
rise of organized terrorism in the Middle East. Just as England and France
created the renewed menace of piracy through their sponsorship of the
corsairs, so too is the United States credited for manufacturing its own
enemy by training, funding and outfitting terrorist groups in the Middle East
during the Cold War. Indeed, criticism that the United States is responsible
for the very threat it now seeks to eliminate has been a formidable stumbling
block against the creation of any new international law on terrorism. But the
lesson to be drawn here is not merely one of history repeating itself, nor even
a reaffirmation of the close historical linkages between the problems of
piracy and terrorism. Here, the history of piracy law not only provides a
precedent to our current dilemma, but also the solution. The 1856
Declaration of Paris is, on one level, recognition of shared guilt and a
promise that the behavior of states which produced the problem will not be
"15 See EARLE, supra note 108, at 266-67.
16 See Buhler, supra note 24, at 64.
117 P~rotin-Dumon, supra note 97, at 45.
"




repeated.11 9 On another level, it represents the first recognition of piracy as a
crime in and of itself, separate from state sponsorship.1 20  The central
premise of hostis humani generi is that a pirate is not an enemy of the state,
but of humankind itself. He exists like a malevolent satellite to the law of
nations, waging war upon them not only through his acts, but through his
identity. Until 1856, international law recognized only two legal entities:
persons and states. Persons were subject to the laws of their own
governments; states were subject to the laws made between them. The
Declaration of Paris and subsequent legislation created a third entity: persons
who lacked both the individual liberties and protections of law to be citizens,
and the legitimacy and sovereignty of states. The creation of this third legal
entity-pirates-was recognition by the states that: 1) piracy as a political tool
was beyond the pale of legitimate state behavior; and, 2) pirates themselves
forfeited the right to the protections of citizenship. In order to create a just
and lasting body of law on organized terrorism, states must apply a similar
understanding of their own behavior and of the crime itself.
In sum, four points are of particular note in establishing the
historical and legal linkages between piracy and terrorism. First, since its
earliest manifestation, the directed use of terror has been an integral part of
piracy. One finds it throughout the history of piracy, from the Vikings to Sir
Francis Drake and Edward Teach. Each understood the political, as well as
personal, benefits of terror. Terror inspired fear in the breast of the victim
before the first shot was fired, an invaluable reputation which facilitated
many bloodless captures. Each also understood that piracy, unlike its
tame counterpart, privateering, did not obey gentlemen's rules. 22 Ferocity
and barbarism were essential components to the trade. Thus, piracy
represents the first use of terror as a means of coercion by a non-state actor
against the flag and trade of the nation-state itself.
123
Second, the history of piracy as a political tool of governments
negates its popular image as mere "sea-robbery," a definition which bears
little similarity to terrorism. Piracy must properly be understood as being as
much a political as a commercial enterprise. From the time of Republican
Rome until the Declaration of 1856, governments employed pirates as
privateers to hinder an enemy's trade, distract its navy, frustrate its relations
119 See Protin-Dumon, supra note 97, at 45.
20 See id.
121 See Pennell, supra note 64, at 10.
122 See Rediker, supra note 55, at 155.
12 3See id.
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with its empire, deplete its coffers, and sometimes drive it toward open
warfare. 24 The extra-legal aspect of government-sponsored piracy provided
a means of wounding a hostile state while continuing to maintain diplomatic
relations. 12 5 As such, it bears remarkable similarity in both execution and
purpose to modem government-sponsored terrorism. In both instances, the
pirate/terrorist acts as a private individual (or organization) acting beyond
the nominal purview of the sponsor state, yet whose actions are directed
toward a coercive political aim of that state.
Third, when employed not as an agent of governments but as a
weapon against them, as in the so-called pirate Golden Age, the motivations
of piracy have strong resonance with contemporary terrorism. The pirates'
"war against the world" provides the earliest historical example of non-state
versus state conflict, the same sort of "war" which al-Qaeda wages today.
This form of conflict must be distinguished from revolutions and civil wars,
which also might be termed state versus non-state, in that here, the
aggressors detach themselves both politically and (more importantly)
physically from the nation-state-leading the revolt from without rather than
within. The argument that international terrorists are revolutionaries falls
apart on these grounds, for revolutions are defined as uprisings within a state
to change its government. 126  A terrorist organization, by becoming
international and therefore extra-legal in character, divorces itself from such
terminology. Likewise, the methods of the contemporary terrorist have
much in common with their piratical forbears; the terrorist, like the pirate,
appears suddenly, attacks his target, and disappears. The amorphous,
extraterritorial composition of modem terrorist organizations provides much
the same function as the Atlantic did for their predecessors. The al-Qaeda
and their kin move covertly through the world like ships across a vast ocean,
surfacing without warning, wreaking havoc, and retreating into an obscure
mist of anonymity.
Finally, once we have established that the means and motivations of
piracy and terrorism are analogous, there remains only to demonstrate that
their legal definitions should be so as well. The case is already a strong one:
pirates and terrorists have been shown to share the same means, the same
motivations, and the same extraterritorial identity. It is a small but crucial
step to make the final link that terrorists share the legal definition of pirates
124 See RUBIN, supra note 23, at 31.
125 See id.
126 See J. Bowyer Bell, Revolutionary Organizations: Special Cases and Imperfect
Models, in INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM AND WORLD SECURITY, supra note 6, at 78.
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as hostis humani generis, enemies of all humankind. As with the Declaration
of 1856, this would involve recognizing: first, that terrorism, like piracy, is
not a legitimate political tool; second, that states, therefore, may not use it as
a means of political coercion; third, that all instances ofterrorism,-as defined
by international covenant,-are equally unlawful, whether state-sponsored or
not; fourth, that terrorism, like piracy, is therefore an international crime sui
generis, not to be confused with the recognized right of peoples to change
their forms of government; fifth, that this crime is by nature international in
scope, and consequently falls under the jurisdiction of the International
Criminal Court; and sixth, that terrorists, as hostis humani generis, are
likewise subject to universal jurisdiction. But historical and legal linkages,
however persuasive, do not alone provide the basis for defining terrorists as
hostis humani generis under international law. For that argument to be
made, we must also consider the current state of international law on piracy.
Burdick Brittin, in advocating a political definition of piracy, begins
with a quote from Alberico Gentile's De jure belli which is particularly
appropriate here:
Pirates are common enemies, and they are attacked with
impunity by all, because they are without the pale of the
law. They are scorners of the law of nations; hence they
find no protection in that law. They ought to be crushed by
us... and by all men. This is a warfare shared by all
nations. 1
27
A quick comparison between Gentile and Hedges, mentioned earlier,
indicates the central conflict between two constructions of the crime of
piracy. Legal advocates of the narrow definition of 'sea robbery' regard the
crime from the perspective of the act itself; while those who, like Gentile and
Brittin, advocate a broader political definition regard it from the perspective
of the actor. The resulting definitions are not only divergent, but
contradictory. If piracy is merely robbery at sea, as the former would argue,
then the logical extent of jurisdiction should be a state's territorial borders,128
and the need for an international law on piracy is thus obviated. Pirates
under this definition are not hostis humani generis, but petty miscreants
127 Burdick H Brittin, The Law of Piracy: Does It Meet the Present and Potential
Challenges?, in PIRACY AT SEA, supra note 21, at 159.
128 However, in cases occurring on the high seas, jurisdiction would rest either with
the state registry of the victimized vessel or the citizenship of the pirates.
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whose actions are distinguished from local felonies only by their maritime
locus. If, however, one views the crime of piracy not from its acts but its
effects, the discourse becomes markedly different. It is now possible to
consider the pirate himself, as distinct from his land-bound cousin the
highwayman or common felon, as a threat to the nation-state.
The trend of piracy law has moved inexorably from an early
understanding of "sea robbery" to a modem and more politicized conception
of "maritime terrorism., 129 This is reflected in the municipal laws of
England and the United States, 130 the work of many twentieth century
scholars,' 3' and even in the mangled machinations which produced the 1958
Convention on the High Seas and the 1982 Conventions on the Law of the
Sea.132 As the nature of piracy itself evolved, the nature of its legal
definition proceeded apace. By the early twentieth century, piracy for
129 This term was coined by the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts
Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation, March 10, 1988,1678 U.N.T.S. 221,27
I.L.M. 668, in which it was listed alongside other crimes including hijacking,
assassination and the taking of hostages. The Convention appeared in the aftermath
of the Achille Lauro incident, at the instigation of a guilt-ridden Italian government
(the Italians had previously refused to extradite the Lauro hijackers to the United
States, citing their abhorrence of capital punishment, and subsequently endured the
full wrath of international outrage). Interestingly, the American case for extradition
cited two crimes: hostage taking, under the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of
1984, and piracy, under 18 U.S.C. § 1651. See also MARITIME TERRORISM AND
INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 89.
130 See The Malek Adhel, 43 U.S. 210 (1844) (defining piracy as an action on the
high seas motivated by "hatred, abuse of power, or a spirit of mischief'). This case
was reaffirmed in 33 U.S.C. §382 (2004).
131 Samuel Menefee, P.W. Bimie and Burdock Brittin have all recommended an
extension of the piracy definition to include acts of maritime terrorism. Brittin
writes that "[b]roadening the criteria for piracy would include such acts of terrorism
thereby making them an international crime. As such the international effort to
contain and meet the challenge of terrorism would be facilitated," supra note 128, at
164.
132 Convention on the High Seas, Apr. 29,1958, arts. 14-19,450 U.N.T.S. 82; U.N.
Convention on the Law of the Sea, Montego Bay, 10 December 1982, arts. 100-
107, 111, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397. The U.N. Conventions specifically exclude political
acts as acts of piracy, retaining the 'private ends' language which had been
specifically included in the 1958 Draft to quash Soviet claims of "piracy" when
their vessels were searched at sea. Yet this language obviously defines "political" as
"state-sponsored," written long before "political" acts could be conceived as being
committed by non-state actors-that is, terrorists.
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monetary ends was a peripheral problem, well within the jurisdictional and
legislative purview of individual states. 133 But piracy as an act of political
coercion was coming into its own. As the number of unquestionably
'piratical' acts receded, states began on their own initiative to stretch the
definition to include newer forms of menace. 1
34
This so-called 'politicization' of piracy has divided jurists into two
distinct and opposite camps. One position, briefly stated, would expand the
definition of piracy to include virtually any act of armed violence at sea.135
This would probably exclude warships, but would most certainly include
rebel vessels or those of revolutionary governments. The second position,
also oversimplified, states that any inquiry into the political dimensions of
piracy necessarily produces a maelstrom of vagaries between political and
private acts. 136 Piracy, therefore, must be wholly divorced from such debates
133 See RUBIN, supra note 23, at 334.
134 See, e.g., The Treaty relating to the Use of Submarines and Noxious Gases in
Warfare, Washington, Feb. 6, 1922, 25 L.N.T.S. 202, concluded between France,
Italy, Japan, Britain and the United States declaring unrestricted submarine warfare
'an act of piracy'; The Nyon Agreement of 1937, 181 L.N.T.S. 137 (entered into
force Sept. 14, 1937), concluded between Britain, France, Belgium, Turkey,
Romania, Greece, Egypt and the USSR, extending universal jurisdiction to
unidentified vessels and aircraft attacking merchant shipping "which should justly
be treated as acts of piracy." The International Maritime Bureau, in 1987, defined
piracy as "an act of boarding any vessel with the intent to commit theft or any other
crime and with the intent or capability to use force in the furtherance of that act,"
Buhler, supra note 24, at 68; the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts
Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation, supra note 130; section 1655 of Title 18
of the United States Code, including acts undertaken for political purposes within its
definition of piracy.
135 See generally Menefee, Birnie, Brittin, supra.
136 A useful summary of this position occurs in the comments of Sir Gerald
Fitzmaurice during the drafting of the 1958 Geneva Convention on the High Seas.
Fitzmaurice and others were rightly concerned that political acts, if included in the
definition, would result in charges leveled by one state against another concerning
acts which were not piratical, but acts of war. In the commentaries to the
Convention, it is remarked that "[i]n view of the immunity from interference by
other ships which warships are entitled to claim, the seizure of such ships on
suspicion of piracy might involve the gravest consequences. Hence the Commission
feels that to assimilate unlawful acts committed by warships to acts of piracy would
be prejudicial to the interests of the international community," Report of the
International Law Commission to the General Assembly, U.N. Doc. A/3159 (1956),
reprinted in [1956] 2 Y.B. Int'l. Comm'n 282, U.N. Doc.
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and limited exclusively to acts committed for private (i.e. pecuniary) gain.
The middle ground between these two definitions is, appropriately, the
specter of maritime terrorism. Though both the 1958 and 1982 Conventions
expressly exclude political piracy, they limit their definition of 'political' to a
conventional idea of state versus state or, alternately, civil war.137 This is
consistent with recorded history to that time, where the pattern of conflict
had been exclusively between states or within states. The situation
envisioned by the drafters was one in which states or revolutionary
organizations employed piracy against their enemies; or, alternately, claimed
that attacks on their shipping by enemy vessels were not legitimate sea
warfare, but piratical. 138  Yet this political exemption is not, most
emphatically, applicable to the current 'war on terrorism.' Organized
terrorism presents a third, hitherto unknown form of conflict: state versus
non-state. Unlike the others, it is not waged within a given territory or over
that territory. Instead, contemporary terrorism, like piracy, is waged all over
the world against a multitude of states. 139 These states, the terrorists'
"enemies," share no necessary commonalities among themselves except loss
of life and property. 40 As the aims of terrorist organizations vary widely
between quasi-legitimate governmental objectives-such as the
establishment of territorial boundaries and the enfranchisement of
minorities-to seemingly apolitical, cultural, or religious ambitions, so too
do the terrorists' motivations vary in determining their "enemies.' 4' A state
may have only peripheral contact with the issue in dispute (as in former
colonial nations), a past history of diplomatic involvement in the disputed
A/CN.4/SER.A/1956/Add. 1. Contrast this with the Soviet delegate Mr. Zourek, who
said that he considered, in particular, that "acts of violence and depredation referred
to in [article 14 of the 1956 draft]... constitute[d] acts of piracy" even when
committed: (a) for political ends; (b) by warships or military aircraft; (c) by aircraft
or seaplanes against foreign aircraft or seaplanes, Summary Records of the 292nd
Meeting, [1955] 1 Y.B. Int'l Comm'n 52, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1955. One can
only wonder if Sir Gerald's objections would have been as forceful had Mr. Zourek
left out parts b) and c).
137 See supra note 133.
138 See Natalino Ronzitti, The Law of the Sea and the Use of Force Against
Terrorist Activities, in MARITIME TERRORISM AND INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note
89, at 2.
139 See Giorgio Gaja, Measures Against Terrorist Acts Under International Law, in
MARITIME TERRORISM AND INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 89, at 20.
140 See Jenkins, supra note 6, at 19.
141See id. at 16-19.
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area (as with the U.S. in Afghanistan), or cultural practices, religious
observances, and governmental regimes which are anathema to the terrorists.
The 'enemy' state might even have no appreciable connection to the
terrorists whatsoever. This situation is markedly different from that
envisioned by the drafters of the 1958 and 1982 Conventions. 142 As the
world has moved beyond the Cold War into a new century and new political
realities, so too will piracy law adopt these realities within a new,
unabashedly political, definition.
Pirates that do not confine themselves to the above-mentioned quasi-
governmental limitations fall outside the "political" exemption. They
become hostis humani generis. So too must terrorists. One might argue, in
contrast, that an organization such as al-Qaeda becomes a defacto political
entity by virtue of its size, complexity, and objectives. But this argument
fails to account for the crucial difference between a revolutionary
government-however disorganized-and a terrorist organization. The
difference lies in the objectives and means: the revolutionaries seek to
replace the existing government with their own, directing their attacks solely
at that government; a terrorist organization has no such limitations on its
agenda, or on the scope of its attacks. Regime change may or may not
coincide with a plethora of other initiatives, and the weapon of terror may be
inflicted against any state or its citizens. It is this lack of limitation which
distinguishes the terrorist from the revolutionary. For a terrorist organization
to represent itself as a belligerent or revolutionary organization within the
definition of the law, it must: (1) confine its attacks to within the
jurisdictional and/or territorial boundaries of a single state; (2) have no
political objective beyond regime change; and, (3) represent itself as the
alternative governmental regime. Likewise, it should be of no greater
account whether the terrorist band is comprised often members or a hundred
thousand members than it would be if a band of pirates attacked with a
phalanx of ships or an inflatable life raft. The law rightly concerns itself
only with determining whether this is a crime or an act of war.
Having demonstrated that the political dimensions of modem
terrorism are not inconsistent with piracy law, it remains to demonstrate that
acts of terrorism are likewise amenable. As previously mentioned, the
current definition of piracy encompasses a number of acts which coincide
with terrorism, most notably murder and destruction of property. If the same
act can be termed both an act of piracy and terrorism, the two definitions
meld.
142 See Ronzitti, supra note 139, at 2.
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A crime, in municipal or international law, has three elements: the
mens rea, the actus reus, and the locus. For terrorism to fall within the
common definition of piracy, it must therefore be consistent in its requisite
mental state, actions, and place of occurrence. The mens rea of piracy is the
desire to inflict death, destruction or deprivation "for private ends.
' 143
Recognizing the difference between the political ends of a revolutionary
government and those of a terrorist organization, we can now conclude that
international terrorism falls outside the political exemption, and thus within
the common understanding of piracy. It, too, seeks to inflict death,
destruction and deprivation, for arguably identical reasons. Second, the
actus reus of piracy, which includes acts of homicide and destruction absent
actual robbery, is, as has been shown here, synonymous with the actus reus
of most forms of modem terrorism. Third, the locus of piracy, while
traditionally confined to the high seas or other territories outside state
jurisdiction, has been expanded to include acts of piracy committed on state
territory "by descent from the sea. ' ' 144 In the classic text International Law,
James Hall explains this concept:
Piracy no doubt can take place independently of the sea,
under the conditions at least of modern civilization; but the
pirate does not so lose his piratical character by landing
within state territory that piratical acts done on shore cease
to be piratical.... [P]iracy may be said to consist in acts of
violence done upon the ocean or unappropriated lands, or
within the territory of the state through descent from the
sea, by a body of men acting independently of any
politically organized society. 
145
Within this idea of 'descent by sea' lies an exciting possibility. The law
does not specify how this descent should occur, where, or whether the pirate
must begin the act of piracy immediately after landfall. 46 Likewise, it
143 U.N. Conference on the Law of the Sea, Montego Bay, 10 December 1982, art.
101, 21 I.L.M. 1245.
144 Harvard Draft Convention of 1932, also known as Harvard Research in
International Law, Draft Convention on Piracy, with Comment, 26 AM. J. OF INT'L
L. Supp. 739, 775 (1932), 775.
145 WILLIAM EDWARD HALL, A TREATISE ON INTERNATIONAL LAW 313-314 (8' ed.
2001) (1924).
146 The presumption, moreover, is that the acts of piracy need not occur
immediately; descent by sea is most definitely not limited to fanciful notions of
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includes the potentiality not only of oceanic but aerial attack. 147 Such attacks
can occur anywhere, provided that, in keeping with the "descent by sea"
requirement, the plane's flight path traverse some body of water. Defined
broadly, it might even apply to any foreign national with the intent to commit
piratical acts arriving in a state other than his own-remembering again that
the crime of piracy is one of intent, not commission. 14 With the mens rea
and actus reus of piracy and terrorism otherwise synonymous, the locus, too,
may be common to both. In sum, the "descent by sea" and aerial provisions
of piracy, taken together, may apply to any terrorist landing on national soil
from overseas with the intention of committing terrorist acts therein. Since
piracy and terrorism share a mens rea, actus reus, and locus, we may
conclude that they are, in effect, the same crime. They must also,
accordingly, share a legal definition. Terrorists, like pirates, are hostis
humani generi under international law.
III. A Model International Law of Terrorism
During one scene in the play A Man for All Seasons, the famous
English jurist and martyr Sir Thomas More is confronted by his evangelical
son-in-law, William Roper. Disagreeing with More's apparent passivity in
the face of an unjust law, Roper declares, "I would tear down every law in
England to get at the Devil!" More responds:
sending the jolly boats ashore, but is concerned rather with the mens rea of the
potential pirate. That is, the pirate who descends upon the locus with the intent to
commit acts of piracy is presumed to be a pirate, regardless of when (or even
whether) those acts commence. Thus, by imputing this same logic to the mens rea
element of terrorism, the terrorist must simply arrive in a foreign locale with the
intention of committing terrorist acts.
147 This point was stated explicitly in the Harvard Draft Convention, supra note 145,
at 809, concluding with a remarkably insightful comment on the evolving nature of
the law itself:
The pirate of tradition attacked on or from the sea. Certainly today,
however, one should not deem the possibility of similar attacks in or from
the air as too slight or too remote for consideration in drafting a
convention on jurisdiction over piratical acts ... A codification of the
jurisdiction of states under the law of nations should not be drafted to fit
only cases raised by present conditions of business, the arts, and criminal
operations.
148 The Supreme Court made this explicit in In re Marianna Flora, 24 U.S. 1, 39
(1825), in which it held that the mens rea of committing piratical acts was sufficient
for criminal liability. See also Buhler, supra note 24, at 64.
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And when the law was down, and the Devil turned round
on you-where will you hide, Roper, the laws all being
flat? This country's planted thick with laws from coast to
coast-man's laws, not God's-and if you cut them
down-and you're just the man to do it-d'you really think
you could stand upright in the winds that blow then? [Yes, I
give the Devil the benefit of law-for my own safety's
sake]. 149
More's warning has never been more apt. As the United States and her
allies pursue their war on terrorism across every continent, the international
community struggles to respond to the two greatest challenges in its recent
history: the unparalleled menace of organized terrorism that threatens to
undermine the very foundations of established states; and, the sudden
emergence of a brash, aggrieved, hegemonic world power that threatens the
delicate balance of alliances in its implacable hunt for those who wronged it.
Questions are suddenly being asked of institutions and principles that long
went unchallenged: "What is the proper role of the United Nations, or its
laws; of the ICC?; of international law itself?" The new millennium has
provided us with an entirely new form of conflict: state versus non-state.
Hence, military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq may one day be seen as a
prelude to the actual conflict between states and terrorists. A necessary
step, perhaps, as the first stage of the battle against terrorism must be to
remove the aegis of state-sponsorship. Ultimately, however, these operations
may serve only to clear the board for an entirely new game: a game unlike
any other, for which there are no rules. The principles of international
relations and international law are predicated on the premise that war is
either between two nations or within one, as in revolution or civil war. This
concept is already becoming obsolete in the face of the war on terrorism.
Sharp breaks have appeared in the relations between the United States and
her erstwhile allies, breaks that may be further exacerbated as this new form
of conflict is played out. The rift between the United States and the United
Nations has been termed an indication that "the gloves are off": in the face
149 ROBERT BOLT, A MAN FOR ALL SEASONS (1962), quoted in JOSEPH P. LASH,
FROM THE DIARIES OF FELIX FRANKFURTER 50 (1975). Lash remarks that at this
particular scene during the performance, Justice Frankfurter of the U.S. Supreme




of a very real and entirely novel threat to its security, the United States no
longer feels bound to defer to international consensus on the means by which
it may protect itself.
Thus, the world may be experiencing a shift in power politics as
great as the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. In the following decade,
the United States reigned as an uneasy hegemon, still feeling the aftershocks
of fifty years of the Cold War, and unsure of its place on the international
scene. During this time, America experienced a decade of unparalleled
prosperity, security, and optimism. Under the liberal leadership of President
Bill Clinton, the United States seemed determined to fulfill its destiny as the
champion of international human rights, freedom, and the rule of law. In the
midst of this euphoria, the International Criminal Court was finally brought
into being, with the enthusiastic support, at first, of the United States.5 0 In
the ten years between 1991 and 2001, it can be argued that the United States
held its position on the international scene as Caesar Augustus once did in
Republican Rome:primus inter pares, first among equals. It was an illusion,
of course-as much as it had been in Augustus' time-but it was a grand
illusion all the same.
On September 11, 2001, the illusion ended. Threats which had
seemed remote in Yemen and Nigeria suddenly became paramount in the
American consciousness. The United States, under President George W.
Bush, embarked on a campaign to root out terrorism at its source, beginning
with states known or suspected to have harbored terrorists. Gaining
international consensus to remove the Taliban in the wake of September 11
was not difficult. However, convincing an uneasy international community
about the similar threat of Iraq one year later proved difficult. Yet, the
lesson that the United States has drawn from its failure to obtain U.N.
support for Operation Iraqi Freedom may not be what was intended. A
majority of Americans, among them many in the leadership, now question
the efficacy of requesting U.N. consent at all for actions regarding state
security. International denunciation of 'American imperialism" rings like a
cry of "0 tempora, 0 mores!,'"'5 and leads to the question of whether the
United States has abandoned the pretence of the world Republic in favor of
Imperial rule.
The arguments of scholars post-September 11 seem to suggest it
has.' 52 The United States has abruptly withdrawn its support from the
150 See Sailer, supra note 15, at 339-40.
151 "Oh the times, Oh the manners!" (from Cicero's First Catilinarian Oration).
152 See, e.g., Rubin, Legal Response to Terror, supra note 8.
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ICC, 153 as it had with the Kyoto Agreements not long before. As it pursues
its war on terrorism, the question is no longer what international guidelines it
must obey, but whether it need obey them at all. Efforts to create a new
international terrorist law may face their greatest obstacle, not from the
terrorists, but from the state most directly affected by that law: the United
States. Ironically, the United States might regard the legal vacuum
surrounding terrorism as an ideal climate for its actions: without the gridiron
of legal responsibility, all is permissible.'
5 4
The United States is, in effect, laying the law flat to get at the devil.
But, More's warning suggests the danger of this course: with law governing
neither states nor terrorists, this twenty-first century conflict has the potential
to degenerate into anarchy. Rule of law is more important than the threat,
however great, to the nation-state. This is so because the rule of law is the
nation-state; law is the matrix for society, and the government's source of
legitimacy. International law translates this relationship from "citizen-to-
government" to "state-to-state," providing a code of diplomatic conduct that
ensures the continued survival of the international community from lawless
war and universal destruction. Organized international terrorism strikes at
the very heart of these relationships. Terrorists, like pirates, engage in a 'war
against the world," challenging both the sovereignty of the state's laws and
the fundamental structure of the state itself. Domestic legal responses, such
as the Patriot Act,155 while an imperative first step, cannot fully address the
problem. The limit of a state's criminal law extends to its borders and its
citizens; it was for this reason that an international criminal law was created
to deal with offenders whose crimes transcended the menace to an individual
state.156 In the past, only one crime was deemed so heinous as to merit this
singular definition: piracy. Today, it is called terrorism.
'53 See Sailer, supra note 15, at 344.
154 Revealingly, neither the American USA Patriot Act (2001) nor the U.N. Security
Council Resolution 1373 (2001) offers a definition of the crime they propose to
eradicate-that is, the crime of terrorism itself. Instead, the former focuses primarily
on a list of criminal terrorist acts (discussed infra) and the means by which the
United States may pursue and capture suspected terrorists within its borders, while
the latter deals exclusively with states' obligations to deter terrorist acts, refuse
sanctuary to terrorists, and withhold financial support. Yet without a working
definition of who these terrorists are, both the Patriot Act and the Resolution lack
gravitas.
'
5 USA Patriot Act, Pub. L. 107-56, 2001 HR 3162, 115 Stat. 272 (2001).
156 Fry, supra note 17, at 174.
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In determining the necessity of an international terrorist law, one
must consider the dual purpose of every criminal law. First, by prescribing
certain conduct, it terms that conduct anathema to society and effects
through punishment to deter it.' 57 Second, by delineating the state's role in
the capture, trial and punishment of offenders, it legitimizes the state as the
just enforcer of universal social principles. 158 International terrorist law
performs both functions: first, terrorism is recognized as a crime sui generis
which is contrary to the social good; second, by ceding their impunity, the
United States and its allies gain legitimacy to capture, adjudicate, and punish
offenders under the law.
It is not enough for the United States to declare that terrorists are
international criminals. For the threat of terrorism to be successfully
countered, this de facto status must be accompanied with a definition de
jure.' 59 International terrorism law will not only govern the legal parameters
ofjurisdiction and capture, it will also give terrorists legal status as enemies
of the human race and subject them to universal jurisdiction. Terrorists will
not be enemies of one state but of all states. Thus, the United States' burden
would be shared by every nation. The war on terrorism would become an
international effort, transforming itself from personal vengeance and
individual state security to international condemnation and the eradication of
a global scourge. Only in this manner can the threat of global terrorism be
successfully countered. Today, Americans question why we must give
terrorists the benefit of international law. The answer is that we must do so
for our own safety's sake.
This article has argued that the only effective means of addressing
the problem of terrorism in international law is through the law of piracy.
Piracy is the ancestor of terrorism, sharing its essential characteristics. Its





'59 Otherwise, as will readily be appreciated, potentially hostile states that the
United States insists hold terrorists may respond, with no counter-argument
possible, that the U.S.'s "terrorists" are indeed revolutionaries. With no definition
under international law, and no international crime of terrorism, states will reach
this impasse again and again, and the "war on terror" may continue sine die.
160 Philip Buhler has even argued that the United States' pursuit of the Barbary
corsairs was "perhaps the first modem assault against the day's version of
international terrorists," and thus a crucial precedent for modem terrorist
legislation. He continues that this might even be seen as "a pioneering effort at the
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blood brother in the law, raising the same problems of definition and
political exception that have frustrated recent attempts to create an
international crime of terrorism. Moreover, pirates share with terrorists the
unique status of individual menaces to the international order, the only such
criminals existing independent from state agency or sponsorship. Based on
the arguments raised in the preceding discussion, the interrelation between
piracy and terrorism cannot be doubted. The question remains, however, of
how best to approach this relationship in the law. This concluding section
will address the question of formulating a new international terrorist law
based on the existing law of piracy. A proposal outlining this law's
definition and jurisdiction will be advanced. Finally, the events of
September 11, 2001, will be used as a test case. The purpose of this test will
not be to merely prove that September 11 fits the definition of an act of
piracy, but that all international acts of terrorism, as noted in this article,
share certain commonalities with piracy sufficient to make them analogous
under the law.
Drawing from the 1982 United Nations Convention of the Law of
the Sea as the most recent source of piracy law, and mindful of all the
debates surrounding the question of political exemptions, piracy on land, and
the problem of maritime terrorism, I recommend that the new definition of
the crime of terrorism, including acts of piracy, be defined as follows:
1) The crime of terrorism is:
a) any illegal acts of violence or detention, or any act of
depredation, destruction of property or homicide;
b) conspiracy to commit such acts, membership in an
organization that conspires to commit these acts, and
any form of active sponsorship including financial
support, refuge, or withholding knowledge of such
activities from the authorities;
c) committed by persons not acting under the color of a
state, government, or revolutionary organization
engaged in the replacement of an established regime
within the borders of its own state;
d) against the citizens or property of another state; and,
extension of U.S. national jurisdiction over 'stateless' international criminals,"
supra note 24, at 64.
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e) with the purpose of inflicting terror on the citizens or
government of that state or achieving international
recognition for a private cause.
f) None of these provisions is meant to contradict or
negate the existing terrorist offences currently
proscribed by UN convention, covenant, treaty,
agreement, or customary international law.
2) Terrorists do not lose their definition under the law if they are
sponsored by a state, government or revolutionary
organization acting in accordance with clause (1)(b):
a) Political exemption is only to be inferred if the
terrorists act as de facto agents of that state,
government, etc., by committing their acts by its direct
order and in furtherance of its policy;
b) In that event, criminal liability transfers from the
terrorists as agents to the state as agency; and
c) the state is then inferred to have committed an act of
war.
d) States that sponsor terrorist activities as outlined in
clause (1)(b) are not inferred to have committed acts of
war, but share criminal liability with the terrorists for
any acts undertaken during their sponsorship.
3) The crime of piracy is defined as sharing the definition given
in sections (1) and (2), specifically for crimes committed:
a) on the high seas, against another ship or aircraft, or
against persons or property on board such ship or
aircraft;
b) against a ship, aircraft, persons or property in a place
outside the jurisdiction of any State; or,
c) against persons or property within the jurisdiction of
the State, where the pirates have:
i) descended by sea to a coastal port; or
ii) descended by air to any city or township.
d) The crime of piracy also includes acts committed for
pecuniary gain.
Spring 2006
U. MIAMI INT'L & COMP. L. REV.
4) Terrorists and pirates are defined as hostis humani generis
under the law of nations, and therefore, they are subject to
universal jurisdiction, meaning:
a) as enemies of all nations, any state may effect the
capture of a suspected offender; and,
b) such capture must be made in accordance with
international law.
c) the capturing state must then either prosecute the
offender under its own laws and in good faith; or,
d) extradite the suspect to the jurisdiction of a requesting
state, or to a requesting competent international tribunal.
There are many reasons for providing a joint definition of piracy and
terrorism, but the most crucial is that it solves the dilemma between political
and non-political acts. We have already seen how piracy law reflects a
gradual shift away from the doctrine of "sea-robbery" to one of "maritime
terrorism", an evolution which was delayed, though not deterred, by the
events of the twentieth century. The political spectrum of terrorism ranges
from legitimate acts of insurgency at one end to isolated, individual acts of
destruction or homicide on the other. The former is protected by the right of
self determination; the latter falls within the jurisdiction of ordinary domestic
criminal law. The hybrid crime of terrorism lies in the murky gulf between
them. Without some precedent from which to draw, no universal definition
of terrorism can ever be agreed upon; for states and lawyers will battle
ceaselessly over what constitutes a 'legitimate' insurgency on the one hand,
and what is an 'ordinary' crime on the other.
Piracy provides the way out of this conundrum, as the definition
offered above indicates. In distinguishing between political and non-political
piracy, the consensus is that for the political exemption to apply, the pirate
must have some direct and appreciable nexus to a recognized government.
This, in short, is the difference between pirating and privateering. 61 While
both acts are offences against international law, the latter criminalizes the
government rather than the individual. The government is perceived to have
committed an act of war against the victim state. Moreover, the illegality of
employing pirates as a fifth column suggests that the agent state may be
subject to charges of war crimes as well. This is precisely the same approach
that I suggest should be applied to the difference between private terrorism
(including state sponsorship as outlined above) and terrorists as agents of the
161 See generally PIRATES AND PRIVATEERS, supra note 84.
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state. We need not become mired in the difference between state
sponsorship and state agency: the former assumes only that the state aids or
finances the terrorist, whereas in the latter example he or she is acting on
direct orders from the state, in furtherance of state policy. In both cases, the
state is equally guilty, though the precise nature of the crime differs between
conspiracy to commit terrorism and war crimes.
The crucial difference between them is not in the culpability of the
state, but of the individual: whereas a terrorist is defined above as hostis
humani generi, persons acting under color of the state are regarded as agents
of that state, and thus not individually liable for the crime of terrorism.
62
Similarly, revolutionaries acting on the orders of a revolutionary government
are likewise not terrorists if their activities are in furtherance of a regime
change within their own state. Some might question how to distinguish
between revolutionary regimes and terrorist organizations. Whereas
revolutionaries seek to replace an existing regime with their own and direct
their attacks toward that end within that nation, terrorist organizations have
neither these political nor geographic limitations.
63
A melding of piracy and terrorism settles the problem of political
exemptions once and for all by removing the gray areas and reducing it to a
simple question: does the suspect act as an agent of a state or revolutionary
regime? If he does, then the other four offences of the ICC govern his
actions. If he does not, then he is a private actor and thus exempt from
prosecution for these crimes. The central purpose of equating piracy with
terrorism is to create a separate category specifically for these individuals.
This article argues that the combination of piracy and terrorism
allows for domestic and international legal recognition, and indeed both are
equally necessary to combat the threat which terrorism poses. The United
States has criminalized most terrorist acts under its own laws,' 64 and, in
2001, passed the USA Patriot Act, which covers a range of terrorist activities
and commensurate state responses, including everything from protecting the
northern border' 65 to extending the permissible use of wire intercepts.1
66
162 This would not, of course, exempt them from other crimes of international
jurisdiction, including war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity. In fact,
the purpose of a terrorist law is to apply it to persons falling outside the jurisdiction
of these crimes due to their 'non political' status. Additionally, they would be
chargeable under applicable domestic law, including murder, assault, and robbery.
16 3 See Bell, supra note 127, at 78.
'64 18 U.S.C. § 2332b (2004).
165 Tit. IV(A).
166Tit. II.
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Title VIII of the Patriot Act, which is headed "Strengthening the Criminal
Laws Against Terrorism," amends the definition of "international terrorism"
outlined in U.S. Code Section 2331.167 The words "assassination or
kidnapping" in the section have been replaced with "mass destruction,
assassination, or kidnapping."' 168 In addition, under the new definition
outlined in the Patriot Act, "domestic terrorism" is defined thus:
(5) The term 'domestic terrorism' means activities that-
(a) involve acts dangerous to human life that are
a violation of the criminal laws of the United
States or of any State;
(b) appear to be intended-
(i) to intimidate or coerce a civilian
population;
(ii) to influence the policy of a
government by intimidation or
coercion; or
(iii) to affect the conduct of a
government by mass destruction,
assassination, or kidnapping; and
(c) occur primarily within the territorial
jurisdiction of the United States. 169
Section 808 of the Patriot Act offers a list of proscribed terrorist activities
which is striking in its inclusiveness. The Act proscribes offences ranging
from the destruction of an energy facility to the manufacture or use of
biological weapons. 170 The Patriot Act is a significant advance in domestic
terrorist legislation. Yet despite its breadth, the Act does little to recognize
the crime of terrorism per se. There is no criminality attached to belonging
to a terrorist organization. The domestic definition remains largely intact,
with the significant addition of "mass destruction," but no linkage is made or
even attempted with any other form of criminal activity, nor does the law
draw from any stated precedent. In sum, the Patriot Act is little more than a
laundry list of proscribed criminal offences, with no recognition of the larger
167 18 U.S.C. § 2331(1)(B)(iii) (2004).
168 id.
169 18 U.S.C. § 2331(5) (2004).
170 USA Patriot Act § 808.
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forces, political and multinational, which lie behind them. As such, it is a
definition without gravitas. For the Patriot Act to gain recognition and
legitimacy it must be wedded to American piracy law. Indeed, by giving
terrorism the definition and precedent of piracy, the United States will in fact
be complementing both laws. A melding of terrorism with the Patriot Act
gives piracy a revitalizing boost of current relevance, while piracy provides
this new terrorist law with both the legitimacy and definition it so
desperately needs. This same function will be served on the international
level, but it is vital in U.S. law. The United States is the principle actor in
the war on terrorism, and hence its laws are the logical locus for the first
reform to occur.
It must be emphasized, however, that this is indeed thefirst reform.
This article advocates a two-stage process by which piracy and terrorism are
wedded in both domestic and international law. As it will be easier-given
the legislative structure of the United States-to effect this change
domestically, it seems preferable to begin the process with domestic laws. A
bill should be introduced before Congress providing a definition along the
lines of that advanced above. This will not be in conflict with any existing
American criminal law. Neither the Patriot Act nor the federal statute
defining piracy171 contain any provisions which prohibit the marriage of
piracy and terrorism; neither provides any historical precedent for the crime
of terrorism at all. Moreover, there is nothing in U.S. piracy laws-in
definition or practice-which would preclude its alliance with terrorism.
There is no doubt that such a reform is permissible under American
law. The question, however, lies in the will of American legislatures to
undertake it. Why should they effect this change, when the current status of
the law allows them to pursue terrorists with relative impunity? One answer,
outlined above, is that the United States has the duty to grant due process to
even the worst criminals. One might also argue that democratic nations have
a special responsibility to make their criminal laws explicit and their
punishments just. Yet, neither of these reasons would likely be sufficient to
persuade a reluctant legislature bent on extracting its pound of flesh from
international terrorists. The primary reason, then, for creating a cohesive
American terrorist law must be to facilitate the pursuit, capture, extradition
and adjudication of terrorists. All these aims would be vastly aided by a
crime of terrorism that owes its source to piracy and shares its principles of
universal jurisdiction and hostis humani generis. Under the current law,
terrorists can only be tried for the crimes enumerated under Section 808 of
171 18 U.S.C. § 1651 (2004).
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the Patriot Act, not for the crime of terrorism itself. Thus, terrorists must
either commit these acts or conspire to commit them; in any event, the focus
is on the act, not the actor. The crime of terrorism, as defined above,
includes liability for mere membership in a terrorist organization. This is
analogous to numerous provisions in piracy law which criminalizes
membership in a pirate band, absent any overt piratical actions.172 The
assumption there, as here, is that membership itself signifies a willful break
from the laws and protection of society and thus classifies the culprit as an
enemy of the human race.
Secondly, the classification of terrorists as enemies of the human
race gives legal credence to almost any action undertaken to capture them, at
home or abroad, under the doctrine of universal jurisdiction. It has already
been remarked that the American courts recognize this principle in piracy
law. A similar recognition for terrorism would mean, in effect, that the
United States may capture suspected terrorists anywhere they may be found,
and compel the extradition of such persons from hostile states on the
grounds of aut dedere autjudicare. 173 A new terrorist law would not signify
that the U.S. could do these things when previously they could not; in fact,
both have been done repeatedly already. Terror suspects such as Osama bin-
Laden are pursued worldwide. The United States has repeatedly demanded
extradition of terrorists ranging from the Achille Lauro hijackers to the
Lockerbie bombers. 174 The difference, however, is that it would now be able
to do so with the foundation of universal jurisdiction beneath it. Defining
terrorists as hostis humani generis has no adverse affect on their capture or
adjudication under the law. On the contrary, such a classification would
primarily serve to: 1) justify past captures and insulate them from
international liability as breaches of state sovereignty; and, 2) provide a
foundation of legality for similar captures undertaken in the future. It is an
172See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1657 (2004) ("Whoever consults, combines, confederates,
or corresponds with any pirate or robber upon the seas, knowing him to be guilty of
any piracy or robbery... Shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than
three years, or both").
173 Sailer, supra note 15, at 325-26. See generally Michael J. Kelly, Cheating
Justice by Cheating Death: The Doctrinal Collision for Prosecuting Foreign
Terrorists-Passage ofAut Dedere Aut Judicare into Customary Law & Refusal to
Extradite Based on the Death Penalty, 20 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 491 (2003)
(discussing the conflict between duty to extradite terrorists under international law
and refusal to send terrorists back to states where they would face the death
penalty).
174 See McGinley, supra note 89, at 693; Sailer, supra note 15, at 327.
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established principle among states that it is always better, given the choice,
to act in accordance with the law rather than in absence of it. A reform of
domestic law along the lines I have outlined will give the United States' war
on terrorism a solid bulwark of legal legitimacy.
Domestic recognition of terrorism and piracy will aid the U.S.
efforts to combat terrorism worldwide; but alone, it provides only part of the
solution. Equally vital is a parallel recognition in international law and the
demarcation of jurisdiction to an international court to try offenders for the
crime. Thus, I advocate the creation of a separate crime of terrorism in the
ICC, with the definition stated above. First and foremost, the function of
international criminal law is to recognize certain forms of conduct which the
international community abjures as threats to society itself.175 Prosecution is
only one aspect of this criminalization; equally important, if not more so, is
the mere recognition of criminality, absent any mechanism for capture or
enforcement. The primacy of the second purpose is evident from the law's
history: whereas certain activities, including piracy, have been deemed
'crimes' against the law of nations for hundreds of years, a viable and
permanent international court designated to try them is still in its infancy.
The problem of enforceability redolent in nearly all international law
suggests that the purpose of such law is as much symbolic as actual. Thus,
while there are many practical arguments for extending ICC jurisdiction to
the crime of terrorism, it is just as important to remember the symbolic
significance of establishing terrorism as an international crime, and terrorists
as hostis humani generis.
Yet the practical arguments cannot be overemphasized, either.
Symbolic significance without actual enforcement has been the persistent
"bugbear" of international criminal law, and is the primary reason the ICC
was created.176 The Court's purpose is to provide a permanent locus of
jurisdiction for crimes that transcend national borders or confound national
judiciaries. 77 International terrorism qualifies on both counts. It is, by
definition, an international crime committed by persons of one state against
persons of another. It is also a considerable problem for domestic courts, as
previous difficulties in extradition and political disputes aptly attest.
In sum, the best course for approaching the problem of international
terrorism is to effect the creation of a new terrorist law, based on the laws of
piracy, for both domestic and international jurisdiction. As long as the
175 See Fry, supra note 17, at 174.
176 See id. at 180.
177 Sailer, supra note 15, at 318.
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United States continues to abstain itself from the ICC, that court will serve as
both a guarantor of due process for accused terrorists and an alternate source
ofjurisdiction for suspects for whom states including the U.S. fail to secure
extradition. Thus, the ICC will not be a competitor or drain on individual
state jurisdiction, but rather a role-model and, more importantly,
complementary judicial body for cases which would be otherwise non-
judicable.178 Domestic and international courts will be working in tandem,
prosecuting a far greater number of cases than either could achieve by
itself.179 Overall, the recognition of terrorists as hostis humani generis by
domestic and international law will give notice to terrorists and the states
that harbor them that there is no safe haven for them anywhere on earth.
Wherever they go, wherever they may hide or seek shelter, they remain
fugitives not only from the nations they have attacked but from the world
entire.
The immediate necessity for an international terrorist law post-
September 11 lends urgency to the debate surrounding that law, removing it
from abstract academic inquiry. It is not enough to merely demonstrate the
close relationship between piracy and terrorism as a basis for new law; it
must also be shown how that law will aid the international community in the
crises ahead. The problem facing jurists is a formidable one. The rapid pace
of events forestalls the dispassionate inquiry necessary for creating a just law
in favor of swift action, yet swift action without the foundation of law may
ultimately worsen the threat of terrorism rather than abate it. Hence, the
argument for creating a new law of terrorism from the existing law of piracy
must not only have academic merit, but practical merit as well. It must
facilitate the capture and prosecution of terrorists under the law, while still
providing the parameters by which states may engage in these activities.
It is for this reason that I have chosen to examine the events of
September 11, 2001, in light of both existing piracy law and the
recommended law of terrorism-as-piracy. It is not my intention, however, to
base the entire legitimacy of this legal argument on its applicability to the
specific circumstances of September 11. Other scholars have made this
mistake in their attempt to relate September 11 to crimes against humanity
and genocide. 180 They have done so by arguing that certain elements of those
attacks-such as Bin Laden's genocidalfatwa or the sheer number of people
178 See generally Sailer, Rosetti, Fry, supra. Each makes a similar argument on this
point.
179 See Rosetti, supra note 4, at 585.
180 See, e.g., Fry, supra note 17, at 169.
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killed-have requisite commonalities with crimes under ICC jurisdiction.' 81
This may be true. But it is not enough to prove that the events of September
11 render it definable as an act of genocide to argue that all terrorist attacks
may be termed thus. The focus should not be on the singularities of
September 11, but on the universal elements which it shares with all
international terrorist attacks.
The first of these is the piratical concept of "descent by sea." This
provision has both singular and universal applicability to September 11.
Singularly, one could argue that the fact that the terrorists flew airliners into
a port city means that the attack was analogous to the sacking of a coastal
port by pirates emerging from their pirate vessel: the only difference is that
the former descended from the air, while the latter descended from the sea
itself. International recognition of aerial piracy negates the significance of
this distinction; it has long been understood that pirate attacks may occur in
the air as from the sea, on the principle that both are outside the jurisdiction
of the state.
82
The circumstances that make September 11 an act of "descent by
sea" have a universal element as well. While not all terrorist attacks occur
on commercial aircraft or against port cities, the idea of international
terrorism presupposes that the terrorist arrives by some means from a country
other that the victim state, with the express purpose of committing a terrorist
act against that state. This is equally true in cases where the terrorist attack
is not against the state itself but its outlying military bases, embassies,
warships, or anywhere around the world where the flag of that state is flying.
In all these circumstances-but most particularly those involving attacks
within the state itself-the idea of 'descent by sea' may be inferred to mean
any person not a citizen who arrives in the state from overseas with terrorist
intentions. As September 11 contains an actual descent by sea-by way of
commercial aircraft-it may also be termed a legal descent by sea in that the
terrorists entered the United States from abroad for the express purpose of
committing an act of destruction and homicide. While the former
circumstances apply to only a limited number of attacks, the latter is nearly
universal.
Second, the concept of destruction and homicide-absent any
intention of taking-is present in September 11, in nearly all acts of
terrorism, and in the law of piracy. The attack on the World Trade Center
accomplished three objectives: it terrorized Americans, killed a significant
"' See id. at 175.
182 See supra note 137.
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number of them, and disrupted trade. In each of these intentions, it was
analogous to the pirates' "war against the world," as well as to the legal
elements of the crime of piracy as wanton destruction, depredation, and
homicide, with or without pecuniary gain. While the scale of September 11
may have been greater, these elements are present in nearly all terrorist
attacks, either singly or in combination.
The third universal aspect of piracy and terrorism reflected in
September 11 is the idea of an 'international' crime committed by foreign
nationals. Although pirates might be considered to be 'at war' with their
own state, the legal definition of pirates removes them from the legal
protection of that state and renders them, in effect, stateless criminals. This
is the practical meaning of hostis humani generis. Terrorists as hostis
humani generis are similarly defined as "international" criminals, and the
crime of terrorism presupposes an attack on the state by outsiders, not
citizens under the aegis of its laws. Accordingly, the definition of terrorism
provided above contains the requirement that the terrorists not be citizens of
the affected state. The reason for this, as I have discussed, is to distinguish
between acts of legitimate rebellion or individual criminality from the crime
of terrorism. Was the Oklahoma City bombing a terrorist act? Under this
definition, it was not. The political motives and even the actions of Timothy
McVeigh may mirror those of a terrorist organization, but the fact that he
was a citizen of the United States must distinguish his crime, however
heinous, from actual terrorism. Were it otherwise, domestic courts would
have the dubious task of distinguishing homicide from acts of terrorism,
which would place an intolerable burden on the legal system. This raises the
difficult question, however, of terrorist acts committed on behalf of an
international terrorist organization by citizens of the affected state. While
these would not, strictly speaking, be crimes of international terrorism, the
nexus between the criminal and the organization-if proven-should be
sufficient to make an exception in jurisdiction and allow the prosecution for
crimes of terrorism to proceed. The justification for this lies in the fact that
terrorists are hostis humani generis, and consequently those citizens allying
themselves with international terrorist organizations remove themselves from
the protection of their state. Conversely, not every act of homicide or
destruction committed by a foreign national may be termed terrorism. As
evidenced by the definition above, the crime of terrorism contains a mens
rea of deliberation to inflict terror or bring attention to a cause. This must be
distinguished from other motivations for homicide, and while the distinction
may not always be entirely clear, it is not beyond the abilities of justices to
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determine whether a suspect acted for private motives or in furtherance of a
terrorist agenda.
Whereas the 'descent by sea' and international components of
September 11 provide the basis for a correlation between piracy and
terrorism for attacks against the state on its own territory, the hijacking
element has applicability to acts committed not against the state per se but
against its property and citizens around the world. September 11, in fact, is
almost unique in combining both these aspects-seizure of an aircraft and
attack on the state-into a single act of terrorism. Yet the seizure of a
commercial aircraft in itself is an act of piracy, defined as taking by force of
a commercial vessel while in transit and holding her passengers and crew
captive. The menace of aerial piracy-first addressed in the 1932 Harvard
Convention 1 83-has been the subject of considerable scholarly debate and is
recognized as a form of terrorism in the 1963 U.N. Convention on Offences
and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft,'84 the 1970 U.N.
Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft,'8 5 and the
1971 U.N. Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the
Safety of Civil Aviation. 186 It is also closely allied to that other great menace
to civilian transit, maritime terrorism. This relationship is underscored by the
1988 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of
Maritime Navigation,'8 7 which came in the wake of the 1985 Achille Lauro
affair. Thus, September 11 can be regarded as the most recent of a series of
piratical attacks against the vessels of the United States and other countries,
and the passengers aboard such vessels. Recalling the definition of piracy as
an act of depredation, destruction, or homicide against a civilian vessel, it is
unquestionable that the seizure of four civilian aircraft and the deliberate
murder of their crew and passengers qualify as piracy under the law.
September 11 may, in fact, be considered as two distinct but
interrelated acts of piracy: the seizure of said aircraft, which is a piratical
taking under both international convention and international customary law
of piracy; and the deliberate use of these aircraft as the means of destroying
United States property and attacking United States territory. The link
between them is the passengers, whose death may be considered in
furtherance of the piratical seizure and of the attack against the World Trade
183 See supra note 145.
114Dec. 6, 1970, 22 U.S.T. 1641, 860 U.N.T.S. 105.
185 See supra note 5.
186id.
187 See supra note 130.
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Center. In either view, the applicability of piracy law to the events of
September 11 has profound implications for applying that same law to the
crime of terrorism itself.
Conclusion
Just as events determine when a law is most needed, those same
events will eventually determine what form that law will take. It is
impossible to speculate on the future of international terrorist law absent the
events of September 11, 2001. Likewise it is not the intention of this article
to transform the law merely because of those attacks, but rather to amend it
so it may respond fairly and adequately to the new reality which they
engendered. That reality, shortly stated, is war. The war on terrorism may
lack the traditional components of state versus state conflict, but it must not
be mistaken for anything else. Two regimes have already fallen in its wake;
more may do so. Yet the war is not truly waged against these sponsor states,
but against the terrorist cells which exist in every nation, including our own.
Terrorists may be of any nationality, and may be found anywhere on earth.
Thus, this new war is not merely between the state and its enemies, but the
state and itself. It presents problems of definition and jurisdiction that have
never been faced, and lie well beyond the existing parameters of domestic
and international law.
The problems posed by a war on terrorism exist not only among
states, but within them as well. Nations have two sets of laws: one for times
of peace, another for war. Under the latter, peacetime liberties are curtailed,
external restraints are imposed upon social commerce, and some freedoms
temporarily suspended. Such measures are deemed necessary to serve the
greater good of protecting the nation from infiltration by its enemies, both
within and without. Yet never in its history has America faced a situation
such as it finds itself in today. Unlike the experiences of the European
states, whose histories are replete with wars, or those of the Middle East and
Africa, where local conflict spans millennia, armed conflict for the United
States has always come in sporadic bursts. Its wars begin and end on
definite dates, and it is entirely unacquainted with the idea of perpetual war.
Today, however, America is in a state of quasi-bellum, or half-war, wherein
the threat and the casualties are undeniable, yet the course of the conflict,
and even the enemy, remains nebulous. We cannot know when the war on
terrorism will end because we cannot use our successes and failures as a
yardstick of its progress. Thus, a universal definition of the crime of




The task before all states, but most particularly America, is to
formulate a new law to govern the pattern of this new and nebulous conflict.
The pervasive, ubiquitous nature of international terrorism mandates that
this law not only address problems affect inter-state relations, but intra-state
criminal matters as well. To do so, terrorist law must effect a combination
unique in our history: a melding of traditional concepts of individual
criminality with traditional concepts of international conflict. The key
problem centers on a class of international criminals whose actions and
allegiances raise them above the status of mere criminals, yet who lack the
legitimacy given to hostile states. If terrorist law does not take into account
this unique hybrid status-half-way between criminal and revolutionary-
then it will certainly fail to address the reality of 2 1 st century terrorism.
Historically, there has been only one class of private, non-state
oriented international criminals, and those are the pirates. Thus it is not
merely advantageous to base the definition of a terrorist on that of a pirate; it
is essential. Classification of terrorism as a crime against humanity or
genocide may address the horrendous nature of the act, but it fails to account
for the singular status of the actor. Both crimes, as with all international
crimes excepting piracy, presume that only states or their agents can be held
responsible. Hence international criminal law, and the ICC itself, are
extensions of the historical presumption that just as conflict can only exist
within or between states, international crimes can only occur during and in
furtherance of these conflicts. The war on terrorism stands in stark contrast
to this presumption, requiring an entirely new perspective not only on the
nature of international relations but of international law as well. The
transformation of the former has already begun, and will emerge by natural
process as the United States continues its pursuit of terrorists across the
globe. But the transformation of the latter must be effected by a positive act;
it cannot rely on events to bring it to fruition, for the law emerges not from
events but in response to them, and is thus a profoundly artificial and man-
made creation. Recall that More spoke of "man's laws, not God's" keeping
order against the Devil's wind. That is the task of terrorism law: to affect a
bulwark against the anarchy inherent in a conflict without territorial
boundaries, obvious contestants, or legal parameters. It is a task that can
only be met by giving terrorists their correct legal status as hostis humani
generi under the law.
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